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ABSTRACT 
 
The advent of electricity market deregulation has placed great emphasis on the 
availability of information, the analysis of this information, and the subsequent decision-
making to optimize system operation in a competitive environment. This creates a need 
for better ways of correlating the market activity with the physical grid operating states 
in real time and sharing such information among market participants. Choices of 
command and control actions may result in different financial consequences for market 
participants and severely impact their profits.  
This work provides a solution, the Intelligent Economic Alarm Processor to be 
implemented in a control center to assist the grid operator in rapidly identifying the 
faulted sections and market operation management.  
The task of fault section estimation is difficult when multiple faults, failures of 
protection devices, and false data are involved. A Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets approach 
has been proposed to tackle the complexities. In this approach, the fuzzy reasoning 
starting from protection system status data and ending with estimation of faulted power 
system section is formulated by Petri-nets. The reasoning process is implemented by 
matrix operations.  
Next, in order to better feed the FRPN model with more accurate inputs, the 
failure rates of the protections devices are analyzed. A new approach to assess the circuit 
breaker’s life cycle or deterioration stages using its control circuit data is introduced. 
Unlike the traditional “mean time” criteria, the deterioration stages have been 
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mathematically defined by setting up the limits of various performance indices.  The 
model can be automatically updated as the new real-time condition-based data become 
available to assess the CB’s operation performance using probability distributions. 
The economic alarm processor module is discussed in the end. This processor 
firstly analyzes the fault severity based on the information retrieved from the fault 
section estimation module, and gives the changes in the LMPs, total generation cost, 
congestion revenue etc. with electricity market schedules and trends. Then some 
suggested restorative actions are given to optimize the overall system benefit. When 
market participants receive such information in advance, they make estimation about the 
system operator's restorative action and their competitors' reaction to it.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Transitions from the zonal based market system to a nodal based market system 
are happening in the U.S. regions, like California ISO and ERCOT etc. [1]. The 
transition brings more complexities in the system operation and electricity market as 
there is larger amount of data and more price signals, as shown in Figure 1[2]. It also has 
placed great emphasis on the availability of the grid information, the analysis of this 
information, and the subsequent decision-making to optimize system operation in a 
competitive environment. 
 
 
Figure 1   Market transition in Texas 
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1.2 Problem Formulation  
1.2.1 Reactive Control System  
Power system operators need to operate the transmission system under 
increasingly complex conditions. The formulations of power markets and open access 
policies have introduced a variety of challenges in system operations. Renewable 
generation, energy storage, demand response, and electric vehicles introduce further 
complexity to system operation. The current monitoring, analysis, and control 
technology for transmission networks may not be able to meet these increasingly diverse 
future challenges.  
Looking ahead, we can see that enhancing the functionalities of system operation 
will be necessary to maintain and improve power system reliability and power quality. 
Energy research organizations have made considerable progress in formulating and 
promoting a vision for of the future smart power grids [3]-[14]. 
Monitoring, analysis and control are three main functions in power system 
operation. If we use human system operators as a metaphor, the monitoring functions are 
the operators’ eyes, the analysis functions are the operators’ brains, and the control 
functions are the operators’ hands. 
The present power system operation, especially monitoring, analysis, and control 
functions, were initially developed in the 1960s. The technologies invented at that time 
have led to computerized one-line diagram visualization, state estimation, and 
contingency analysis. The typical present technology of monitoring, analysis, and 
control is briefly summarized here. 
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The monitoring system is based on raw data or output from state estimation, 
which is subject to a considerable delay at the scale of tens of seconds to minutes. It is 
usually based on the local information of a control area. Interaction with neighboring 
systems is limited. Computer-aided visualizations are available, but only in one-line 
diagrams without customization. 
The security assessment is based on contingency screening, which is essentially a 
steady-state power flow analysis. Voltage stability analysis is simulation-based, which 
depends on the accuracy of the models and the performance of the state estimator. 
The protection and control system is mostly based on local information. Some 
recent work considering global impact using special protection schemes (SPS) is based 
on offline studies to adjust control strategies. In general, the coordination of different 
protection and control systems is limited. The process of system restoration is mainly 
based upon operators’ experience and results from offline studies. 
As shown in  
Figure 2, the current system operation at control centers is reactive. Operators’ 
eyes are reading the raw data, with limited information provided to the brains. The 
brains are trying to comprehend the current situation, generally based on past experience 
and preliminary assumptions. Such limited functionality may not be adequate to meet the 
needs of an increasingly complex and stressed power grid. 
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Figure 2   Current control center and its functions 
 
On the other hand, the vision for future control centers, also referred to as smart 
control centers, can be a critical part of the overall framework of the future smart grid. 
This vision has the following five characteristics: 
 Human-centered; 
 Comprehensive; 
 Proactive; 
 Coordinated; 
 Self-healing. 
The growth of new energy resources, the emerging transmission and substation 
technologies, and advances in communication and computing infrastructures [15]-[19], 
require power system engineers to re-think how to perform real-time monitoring, 
analysis, and control. 
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1.2.2 Grid and Market Relationship  
The Independent System Operator (ISO) has the basic responsibilities to perform 
system security monitoring functions and re-dispatch generation as necessary to 
eliminate real-time transmission congestion and to maintain system reliability, including 
taking all necessary emergency actions to maintain the security of the system in both 
normal and abnormal operating conditions. The main functions of the ISO can be 
categorized into reliability-related functions and market-related functions. 
The reliability-related functions include two aspects: 
 System operation and coordination. The ISO should perform system security 
monitoring functions and re-dispatch generation as necessary to eliminate real-
time transmission congestion and to maintain system reliability, including taking 
all necessary emergency actions to maintain the security of the system in both 
normal and abnormal operating conditions. 
 Transmission planning and construction. The ISO should carry out reliability 
studies and planning activities in coordination with the transmission owners and 
other market participants to assure the adequacy of the transmission system. The 
ISO should publish data, studies and plans relating to the adequacy of the 
transmission system. Data might include locational congestion prices and 
planning studies that identify options for actions that might be taken to remedy 
reliability problems on the grid and cost data for some of these actions. 
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The market-related functions of an ISO must be carried out according to 
transparent, understandable rules and protocols. The following operational functions are 
necessary to enable a competitive generation market: 
 Determine Available Transmission Capability (ATC) for all paths of interest 
within the ISO region. 
 Receive and process all requests for transmission service within and through the 
ISO region from all participants, including transmission owners. 
 Schedule all transactions it has approved. 
 Operate or participate in an Open Access Same Time Information System 
(OASIS) for information publishing. 
 Establish a clear ranking of transmission rights of all the participants on the ISO 
transmission system. Facilitate trading of transmission rights on its grid among 
participants. 
 Manage transmission congestion in accordance with established rules and 
procedures for generation re-dispatch and its cost allocation. 
 Assure the provision of ancillary services required to support all scheduled 
delivery transactions. 
 Market settlement and billing functions. 
The minimum functions of the ISO should include the operation and coordination 
of the power system to ensure security. In this case, a separate market operator (for 
example, the Power Exchange in California) is needed to perform the market-related 
functions. On the other hand, the maximum functions of the ISO will include all the 
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reliability-related and market-related functions mentioned above and in addition the ISO 
is the transmission owner (for example, the National Grid Company of UK). The 
reliability-related and market-related functions of the ISO at various sizes and time 
scales are shown below in Figure 3 [20].  
 
Figure 3   ISO responsibilities 
 
However, the system reliability versus system economics is still an issue that has 
not been fully resolved yet. In addition, current Energy Management System (EMS) and 
Market Management System (MMS) are still two individually-operated system and 
closer links need to be provided. This creates an urgent need for better ways of 
correlating the market activity with the physical grid operating states in real time and 
sharing such information among market participants. Choices of command and control 
actions may result in different financial consequences for market participants and 
severely impact their profits. Because of this, new solutions have to be implemented 
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toward integrating grid control and market operations taking into account both good 
engineering practices and appropriate economic incentives. 
In order to establish an effective real-time monitoring and control system for 
integrated grid and market operations, the relationship between the two needs to be 
examined. The market structure for scheduling electricity includes forward bilateral 
contracts and centrally coordinated markets for day ahead, hour ahead and real-time 
energy and ancillary services. Once the forward markets have closed, the real time 
market operation coincides with real time system operations. Schedules from the 
forward markets are implemented in the real time dispatch and resources made available 
through the markets to provide ancillary services are selected and dispatched by the 
system operator for balancing and regulation.  
When some operating parameters, such as voltage/current, exceed acceptable 
limits, the system shifts spontaneously (dotted line in Figure 4) to an unstable 
“Emergency” state. The result is usually an automatic control action (solid line in Figure 
4), such as the tripping of a relay, which takes the system into a more stable but not fully 
functional “Restorative” state. Analogous states and transitions are also applicable in 
electricity markets, with some notable differences, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Type Configuration Market 
Parameters 
Normal All MPs 
complete 
Within 
Limits 
Emergency All MPs 
complete 
Parameter(s) 
violate the 
limits 
Restorative Structure 
incomplete 
Within 
limits 
*MPs(Market Participants) include generator companies, 
transmission owners, load serving entities and other non-
asset owners such as energy traders. 
Figure 4   System and market operating states 
 
1.2.3 Challenges of Alarm Processing 
As the power system get operated closer to the limits and operating conditions 
get more complex, operators are often overloaded with tremendous number of alarm 
messages generated by the events in the system. A major power system disturbance 
could trigger hundreds and sometimes thousands of individual alarms and events [21]. 
Some estimates of the maximum number of alarms which could be triggered by several 
types of events have been established for the regional control centers of Hydro Quebec 
[22]: 
 Up to 150 alarms for a transformer fault 
 Up to 2000 alarms for a generation substation fault, the first 300 alarms being 
generated during the first five seconds 
 Up to 20 alarms per seconds during a thunderstorm 
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 Up to 15,000 alarms for each regional center during the first five seconds of a 
complete system collapse 
Obviously this is beyond the capacity of any operators to handle quickly and 
reliably. Thus, under stressful conditions operators may not be able to respond to the 
unfolding events in a timely manner, and even worse, the alarm interpretation by the 
operators may be either wrong or inconclusive.  
Nowadays, many supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
have already employed Intelligent Alarm Processing (IAP). The past work [21]-[24] 
seems to point out that an intelligent alarm processor that can analyze large number of 
alarm messages efficiently and extract information that explains the network events 
quickly is utilizing experts systems and/or fuzzy logic techniques [24][25] to improve 
processing of data from either SCADA system or from substation intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs) [26]. A consensus is that the intelligent alarm processors need to meet the 
following requirements [27]: 
 Reduce the number of alarms presented to the operator 
 Convey a clearer idea of the power system condition causing the alarms 
 Recommend corrective action to the operator if such action is needed 
These goals are clearly not independent. An effective reduction in the number of 
alarms cannot be achieved just by reorganizing the overall list of alarms into categorized 
lists that contain smaller number of related alarms. More informative messages must be 
generated by combining simpler messages. Reciprocally, if a better description of the 
problem affecting the power system is displayed for the operator, there is often no need 
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to present all the details. Finally, recommending a corrective action is not possible until 
the problem has been fully understood and explained. 
 
1.3 Current Research Efforts 
1.3.1 Coordination between Grid and Market 
Many studies have been done to illustrate the relationship between physical 
system operations and market activities from different aspects. One of the them is that 
Jonathan W. Stahlhut and Gerald Thomas Heydt in Arizona State University have 
proposed to use locational marginal prices (LMPs) to evaluate the impact on the power 
system [28]. Since power markets play a key role in the flow of power in the 
transmission network, power market transactions, influenced by the LMP values as well 
as other economic signals, should play a role in everyday operations of the power 
system. Other references [29][30] have been put efforts to replicate the real time 
competitive process in the contemporary deregulated power market environment. 
Reference [31] describes the interface and persistent gap between market and system 
operations in restructured electricity markets along with some lessoned learned through 
the restructuring experience in the United States and abroad. References [32][33] discuss 
how the market risks in operations can be measured and those risks may be managed in 
both operational and financial ways. Models have been proposed to demonstrate the 
financial effects of power purchase based on probability and consequences. The work in 
[34] analyzes the impacts of emergency events on day-ahead and real-time market 
LMPs. The concept of “economic alarm” was first raised in [28] to augment 
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conventional electrical alarms and to bring to the attention of transmission system 
operators and market participants changes in system operating and economic conditions 
in an electric power system. The authors ranked the alarm based on the economic 
severity, and a set of predetermined events that would give certain suppliers the ability to 
exercise market power will trigger an alarm. 
 
1.3.2 Alarm Processing Techniques 
Since the late eighties, the concepts of filtering and suppressing alarms have been 
used in many practical systems [35]. This was achieved using intelligent techniques. The 
major intelligent techniques used so far include:  
Expert System (ES) Technique 
Expert system (ES) technique [36]-[39] is well suited for a diagnosis problem 
like fault section estimation because it mimics the behavior of fault analysis experts 
which perform fact-rule comparisons and search consequent steps. The disadvantage is 
that an expert system has to be developed using formalized knowledge that correctly 
captures the expertise, which may require an extensive expert interviewing effort. 
Fuzzy Logic (FL) Technique 
FL technique [40][41] offers a convenient means for modeling inexactness and 
uncertainties; hence a powerful solution to handle the imprecise and incomplete data 
may be implemented. The disadvantage is the need to have empirical data that helps 
determine the membership function and properties of fuzzy variables. 
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Petri-nets (PN) Technique 
Petri-nets (PN) based technique [42]-[45] possesses the characteristics of 
graphical discrete event representation and parallel information processing. While very 
fast, the dynamic nature of the temporal change of the alarms cannot be easily captured 
with the standard Petri-net approach unless further adjustments are made. 
Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) Technique 
Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) technique [46]-[48] gains the advantages of 
Expert System and Fuzzy Logic, as well as parallel information processing. Some of the 
disadvantages of previously mentioned individual techniques may be offset by the 
benefits coming from combining the techniques. 
An implicit disadvantage of the traditional knowledge-based systems is that they 
may be incapable of handling complex scenarios that are not encountered during 
knowledge acquisition, implementation, or validation. They may also suffer from the 
slowness in analysis due to involved knowledge representation and inference 
mechanism. Solutions based on discrete event view of Petri-nets also have several 
limitations. For instance, the number of initial inputs is limited and it is difficult to 
model inexactness and uncertainties. Consequently, to accurately identify fault sections 
under complex circumstances, substantial heuristic rules and information are 
additionally required. 
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1.3.3 The Impacts of Topology Changes on Electricity Market 
Traditionally, transmission elements in electrical networks are characterized as 
static assets. In regulated areas, the utility dispatches generators over this fixed system to 
minimize cost and in restructured regions generators use this network as a means to 
compete with one another. However, it is acknowledged, both formally and informally, 
that system operators can and do change the grid topology to improve voltage profiles or 
increase transfer capacity of a flowgate [49][50]. These decisions are made at the 
discretion of the operators, rather than in an automated or systematic way. Anecdotal 
evidence exists that some system operators switch lines in and out because of reactive 
power consumption or production of lines, or other reasons [49]. The Northeast Power 
Coordinating Council includes “switch out internal transmission lines” in the list of 
possible actions to avoid abnormal voltage conditions [51][52]. There is also a national 
push to model the grid in a more sophisticated, smarter way as well as to introduce 
advanced technologies and control mechanisms into grid operations. 
A Corrective Mechanism 
 Glavitsch [53] gives an overview of the use of transmission switching as a 
corrective mechanism in response to a contingency. He discusses the formulation of such 
a problem and provides an overview on search techniques to solve the problem. Mazi et 
al. [54] propose a method to alleviate line overloading due to a contingency by the use of 
transmission switching as a corrective mechanism. This method is limited since it is a 
heuristic technique, which does not consider all possible transmission switching 
solutions and it does not co-optimize the topology with the generation. Gorenstin et al. 
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[55] study a similar problem concerning transmission switching as a corrective 
mechanism; they use a linear approximate Optimal Power Flow (OPF) formulation and 
solve the problem based on branch and bound. Bacher et al. [56] further examine 
transmission switching in the AC setting to relieve line overloads; however, they assume 
that the generation dispatch is already determined and fixed thereby not capturing the 
benefit of co-optimizing the network topology with generation. Bakitzis et al. [57] 
examine transmission switching as a corrective mechanism both with a continuous 
variable formulation for the switching decision as well as with discrete control variables. 
Schnyder et al. [58][59] proposed a fast corrective switching algorithm to be 
used in response to a contingency. The benefit of this algorithm over past research is that 
they simultaneously consider the control over the network topology and the ability to 
redispatch generation whereas other methods would assume that the generation is fixed 
when trying to determine the appropriate switching action. Due to the complexity of this 
problem for its time, this method does not search for the actual optimal topology but 
rather considers limited switching actions. Rolim et al. [60] provide a review of past 
transmission switching methods, the solution techniques used, the objective at hand, etc. 
Shao et al. [61] continued previous research on the use of transmission switching as a 
corrective mechanism to relieve line overloads and voltage violations. They propose a 
new solution technique to find the best switching actions. Their technique employs a 
sparse inverse technique and involves a fast decoupled power flow in order to reduce the 
number of required iterations. In Shao et al. [62], a binary integer programming 
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technique is used for the same motivation: to use switching actions as a corrective 
mechanism to relieve line overloads and voltage violations. 
A Loss Minimization Tool  
 In Bacher et al. [63], they propose switching to minimize system losses. This 
paper demonstrates that contrary to general belief, it is possible to reduce electrical 
losses in the network by temporarily opening a transmission line. Fliscounakis [64] 
proposed a mixed integer linear program to determine the optimal transmission topology 
with the objective to minimize losses. Unlike past research, this model does search for 
the optimal topology but it does not consider the impact on generation and, therefore, 
their method does not provide the true social welfare maximizing solution that is desired 
by co-optimizing the generation along with the transmission topology. It is in fact 
possible that the true social welfare maximizing solution may have an increase in losses 
but by accounting for the influence between generation and transmission, the overall 
costs may still be lower. This possibility further emphasizes the need to co-optimize the 
generation with the topology and that the objective should not be to minimize losses but 
rather to maximize the total social welfare, i.e., the market surplus. In contrast to these 
approaches, the optimal transmission switching concept maximizes the market surplus 
by co-optimizing the transmission topology along with generation. 
A Congestion Management Tool 
Granelli et al. [65] propose transmission switching as a tool to manage 
congestion in the electrical grid. They discuss ways to solve this problem by genetic 
algorithms as well as deterministic approaches. This approach attempts to minimize the 
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amount of overloads in the network since they are not co-optimizing the generation with 
the topology. Thus, this is an after the fact approach where generation is first dispatched 
optimally but then this method is employed to reduce network congestion. 
Maintenance Scheduling 
The focus of past transmission line maintenance scheduling was on the effect on 
reliability. However, just as transmission lines affect reliability they also affect the 
operational costs of the electrical grid. Operators are now acknowledging the importance 
of transmission line maintenance scheduling not only regarding its effect on reliability 
but on operational costs. For instance, ISONE recently released a report stating that they 
saved $72 million in 2008 by considering the impact of transmission line maintenance 
scheduling on the overall operational costs, see ISONE [66]. 
Dispatchable Networks 
The initial concept of a dispatchable network was first proposed by O’Neill et al. 
[67]. Fisher et al. [49] further developed and examined the concept of incorporating the 
control of transmission assets into dispatch optimization formulations. They claimed that 
real-time control can result in more efficient transmission topologies than static ones, 
even if the static ones were originally designed to be optimal. 
 
1.4 Proposed Research 
A breakdown of the proposed research in this dissertation is as follows: 
 Develop a quick and effective fault section estimation module that can quickly 
make a cause-effect reasoning using logic-based network. 
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 Handles incomplete or false alarms such as missing relay signals or malfunction 
of circuit breaker operation 
 Allows easy modification of the model setup and input data choices. 
 Provides a methodology to assess the protection devices’ reliability and life 
cycle/deterioration stages to help better make decisions to optimally allocate the 
maintenance resources. In addition, it gives insight into which component of the 
breaker is causing the problem instead of just reporting the failure rate (number of 
failures per year). 
 A proposed Intelligent Economic Alarm Processor will take electrical grid alarms 
and power market schedules and trends, such as LMPs and prices as inputs and 
have the system operational alarms, fault severity indications and solutions as well 
as the impact on the electricity market as outputs 
 
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation starts with the review of the background knowledge of the 
power system elements in Section 2. A Fuzzy-Reasoning Petri-nets model is proposed as 
an effective alarm processing tool in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the performance 
characteristics of the substation IED data measurement chain by focusing on industry 
standards for the instruments used. It also focuses how efficiently substation IED data 
along with the traditional SCADA data and other available data can be integrated to 
enhance the intelligent alarm processor application. In Section 5, a novel life cycle 
assessment model using condition-based data is proposed to evaluate protection devices’ 
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deterioration stages and failure rates. The FPRN model is extended to an Intelligent 
Economic Alarm Processor in Section 6 to integrate grid control and market operations 
taking into account both engineering practices and appropriate economic incentives.    
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2. BACKGROUND  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Section describes the background knowledge of the power system elements 
for the dissertation study. First, different sections of a power system and their 
corresponding protection systems are explained. Then the application of SCADA 
system, circuit breaker and digital protective relays, which are the data source for fault 
analysis are introduced. 
 
2.2 Protection Systems 
A power system is composed of a lot of sections such as generators, 
transformers, bus bars and transmission lines. These sections are protected by protective 
relaying systems comprising instrument transformers, protective relays, circuit breakers 
and communication equipment. In case of a fault occurring on a section, its associated 
protective relays should detect the fault and issue trip signals to open their associated 
circuit breakers to isolate the faulted section from the rest of the power system, in order 
to avoid further damage to the power system. Figure 5 is an example of power system 
sections with their protection systems. G1 is a generator. T1 is a transformer B1,...,B5 
are bus bars. L45 is a transmission line. RG is a generator protective relay. RT is a 
transformer protective relay. RB is a bus protective relay. RL-4,...,RL-9 are transmission 
line protective relays. C1,..., C9 are circuit breakers. 
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Figure 5   Example of power system sections with their protection systems 
 
2.3 SCADA System 
SCADA, which stands for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, usually 
refers to centralized systems that monitor and control the entire site. Remote Terminal 
Unit (RTU) of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System is most 
widely used data acquisition equipment in substations. They are capable of recording 
status signals such as relay targets, circuit breaker status, transformer status and 
substation alarms, as well as analog signals such as bus voltages and line currents [68]. 
The recorded data from RTUs distributed in substations at different locations can be 
transferred to a central control center via certain communication links. Figure 6 shows 
the common structure of SCADA systems. 
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Figure 6   SCADA system structure 
 
There are several limitations of SCADA systems, which may restrict its 
performance in power system fault analysis applications. 
1. The number of I/O ports of RTUs is limited. For monitoring of protection system 
status, usually only relay trip signals and circuit breaker status signals are 
selected to be recorded. Due to the limitation, it is difficult to use additional 
information such as zone of operation, pickup, circuit breaker control circuit 
status to improve the determination of relay trip and circuit breaker switching 
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status signals. 
2. The timing accuracy of events recorded by RTUs is limited. RTUs usually have 
low scanning rates, which may be in the order of seconds. In practice, some 
RTUs use flags to label recorded events and then time-tag them using the 
scanning time. That means many events occurring in a short time interval may 
have the same time-stamp. Some other RTUs do not time-tag recorded events in 
the first place. Instead, the time when the master computer of the SCADA system 
receives event information is used as the time-stamp. Since there are always time 
delays because of data transmission, the timing accuracy of events is further 
degraded. Such limitation makes using sequence of events information difficult.  
 
2.4 Circuit Breaker 
Main components of a circuit breaker are its operating mechanism, contacts, 
control circuit and interrupting medium. The function of operating mechanism is to open 
or close the breaker contacts upon a command. As shown in Figure 7 the operating 
mechanism consists of various components such as operating rod, springs, valves, 
latches, cams, rollers, bolts, washers etc. 
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Figure 7   Circuit breaker operating mechanism [69] 
 
Contacts are metal parts and carry the load current when circuit breaker is in 
closed position. The electrical representation of the control circuit is shown in Figure 8. 
Control circuit issues a command to the circuit breaker, and in turn the operating 
mechanism reacts and opens the breaker contacts. Contacts are located in interrupting 
chamber where arc extinction takes place. Air Blast and Oil circuit breakers are 
considered in this study. 
 
 
Figure 8   Electrical representation of circuit breaker control circuit [70] 
 25 
  
The circuit breaker monitoring device can monitor 15 electrical signals from the 
circuit breaker control circuit. The signals are generated during either tripping or closing 
of the circuit breaker. Of these 15 signals, 11 are analog and 4 are status signals. The 
monitored signals are listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1   Signals of Circuit Breaker Control Circuit 
Group Signal Name 
Digital signals 
Trip Initiate 
Close Initiate 
X Coil signal 
Y Coil signal 
Contacts 
“A” Contact 
“B” Contact 
DC Voltages 
Control DC Voltage 
Yard DC Voltage 
Light Wire 
Coil Currents 
Trip Coil (TC) Current 1 
Trip Coil (TC) Current 2 
Closing Coil (CC) Current 
Phase Currents 
Phase Current A 
Phase Current B 
Phase Current C 
 
  
The most important signals are Trip Initiate and Close Initiate. These signals, 
initiated by the relay or the operator, cause generation of some other signals, as a result 
of the circuit breaker tripping or closing. All of the monitored signals are voltage signals. 
The signals representing currents are taken from shunts, thus converting them to 
appropriate voltage signals. In the worst case scenario time between the fault occurrence 
and the breaker lockout is about one minute. The monitoring device is designed to record 
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and store recorded data for this duration. 
 A block diagram of the Circuit Breaker Monitor IED is shown in Figure 9 [70]. 
The system consists of following modules:  
1. Signal conditioning boards: The Signal conditioning and isolation module 
provides appropriate voltage levels for data acquisition. The voltage levels of 
signals at circuit breaker are either 130VDC or 1 VDC. The signal 
conditioning module conditions the input signals to be in the [-5, +5]V range 
as required at the input of the A/D converter module. The module has 
adjustable gain for all 15 channels. A user determines suitable gain values for 
the hardware to be used with input signals during set up. The gain can be 
adjusted by software within a certain range for precise calibration in case of 
drift over time. The module also provides galvanic isolation of the signals at 
the input to prevent faults at the input of the module from damaging the rest 
of the system.  
2. Analog to digital converter: The A/D converter employed has 16 channels 
and a 16 bit resolution. It takes the input from signal conditioning board and 
converts it to digital form. The sampling on the 15 channels utilized is 
synchronous. The sampling rate used is 5760 Hz but can be modified by 
software depending on the capability of the A/D converter.  
3. Microprocessor: A microprocessor belonging to the x86 family is used for 
controlling the data acquisition and running the communication protocols. 
The microprocessor is equipped with 32 MB of memory to store 1 minute of 
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data in case of offline monitoring. 
4. Wireless Transmitter: A wireless system capable of transmitting data to 
distances over 200m is used for transmitting the recorded data to the 
concentrator PC. A transfer protocol for data transfer is established and the 
receiving software is set up appropriately. The transmission bandwidth of the 
transmitter for real time monitoring is chosen to be larger than 1.4Mbps 
(5760Hz x 15 channels x 16 bits).  
 
 
Figure 9   Circuit breaker monitor diagram 
 
2.5 Digital Protective Relay 
To achieve maximum flexibility, the firmware of digital relays is designed using 
the concept of functional elements. These elements usually include protection elements, 
control elements, and input and output contacts. The statuses of each element are 
represented by a set of predefined logic operands. As examples, Table 2 shows several 
logic operands for Ground Distance Zone 1 Element of GE's D60 relay [71]. 
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Table 2   Operands for Ground Distance ZONE 1 Element of D60 relay 
Group Signal Name 
Digital signals Ground Distance Zone 1 has picked up 
Contacts Ground Distance Zone 1 has operated 
DC Voltages Ground Distance Zone 1 Phase A has picked up 
Coil Currents Ground Distance Zone 1 Phase B has operated 
Phase Currents Ground Distance Zone 1 Phase C has dropped out 
 
Although relays from different manufacturers have different syntax for their 
logic operands, the functions of logic operands remain the same. First, logic operands 
can be used as logic variables to produce more complex schemes by logic operators in 
field programmable logic function provided by relays. Second, logic operands give 
information on the actual statuses of elements. Time-stamped logic operands are used as 
event record data to reflect detailed relay behaviors. Logic operands can also be recorded 
as digital oscillography data so that the statuses of elements can be visualized [72]. 
When fault occurs, elements change their statuses according to their design 
principles and settings. A timed protection operation chain will be formed in order to trip 
the circuit breaker associated with the relay to interrupt fault currents in predetermined 
time. Figure 10 illustrates the protection operation chain. In this chain, pickup of 
individual phases of elements is the first step and the current interruption by circuit 
breaker is the last step.  
Along the chain, operation of any individual phase of an element will cause 
operation of the entire element. That is to say, operation of individual phases of a 
protection element triggers operation of the entire element through “or” relation. 
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Likewise, operation of several protection elements also triggers the relay trip through 
“or” relation. Operation of an element may be blocked by pickup or operation of another 
element or external block signals if pilot communication schemes are involved. 
 
 
Figure 10   Protection operation flowchart 
 
Most digital protective relays possess the capability of generating ¯les which 
contain detailed data about power system fault disturbances and corresponding responses 
of protection system components. These data can be classified into four categories, 
namely oscillography data, setting data, fault data and event record data. Generally, 
oscillography data contain the records of what a relay “sees” during a disturbance event. 
Setting data specifies how the relay is configured. Fault data presents fault disturbance 
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information calculated by the relay. Event data reveal how the relay and associated 
protection components actually respond to the disturbance event. Besides these relay-
generated data, performance specification data such as the average pickup time for a 
phase distance element and average opening time for a circuit breaker are also important 
information. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This Section explores the background knowledge of the power system elements 
for the dissertation study. A power system consists of a lot of sections, which are 
protected by their corresponding protection systems. Based on such a relation, protection 
system data can be utilized for fault analysis. SCADA systems are the traditional data 
source in power systems. Several limitations of SCADA systems may restrict their 
performance in fault analysis applications. The use of circuit breaker monitor makes it 
attractive to retrieve electrical signals from the circuit breaker control circuit to monitor 
the reliability of the operating status of the circuit breaker. Intelligent electronic devices 
such as digital protective relays provide additional information about protection system 
operation as well as fault events for fault analysis applications. 
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3. INTELLIGENT ALARM PROCESSOR USING FUZZY REASONING PETRI-NET 
ALGORITHM* 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A major power system disturbance could trigger hundreds and sometimes 
thousands of individual alarms and events. A better and simpler description of the 
problems affecting the power system is an urgent need for the operators. The task of an 
Intelligent Alarm Processor (IAP) is to analyze thousands of alarm messages and extract 
the information that explains cause-effect sequences associated with the network events. 
In this sense, Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets is a very powerful intelligent technique to deal 
with the complexities of the power system fault and alarm processing. A graphical 
FRPN model is built in this section based on the optimal structure and uses fuzzy logic 
parameters to effectively tackle the uncertainties. Case studies are presented to 
demonstrate the capability of the IAP under real fault scenarios. 
 
3.2 Fundamental Fault Analysis Techniques 
3.2.1 Backward Reasoning 
Backward chaining is reasoning in reverse from a hypothesis, which is a potential 
conclusion to be proved, to the facts which support the hypothesis. A hypothesis can be 
viewed as a fact whose truth is in doubt and needs to be established. The hypothesis can 
                                                 
* Part of the material in this section is reprinted from “Grid Monitoring and Market Risk Management???????
????????????????????????????????????,” by Yufan Guan, and Mladen Kezunovic, IEEE Intelligent Systems., 
Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 18-21, March-April 2011. DOI: 10.1109/MIS.2011.6 2011 IEEE, with permission from 
IEEE. 
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then be interpreted as a goal to be proven [73]. Figure 11 illustrates the concept of 
backward chaining. In order to prove hypothesis H1, at least one of the intermediate 
hypothesis H2, H3 and H4 must be proven. To prove H2, fact A must exist. Since fact A 
is not present, H2 is disproven. To prove hypothesis H3, both hypothesis H5 and H6 
must be proven. Since the absence of fact B will disprove hypothesis H5, Hypothesis H3 
is disproven. To prove hypothesis H4, hypothesis H7 must be proven. The existence of 
fact E and F will prove hypothesis H7, hence hypothesis H4 is proven. Finally 
hypothesis H1 is proven. 
 
F
H1
Initial
Hypothesis
Intermediate
Hypothesis
(sub-goals)
Evidence 
(facts)
- OR - AND
- True Hypothesis
- Existing Evidence
H1 H1
H1
H1
H1 H1
EDCBA
- False Hypothesis
- Missing Evidence  
Figure 11   Backward reasoning example 
 
3.2.2 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is a logic based system that generalizes the classical two-valued 
logic for reasoning under uncertainty. The concept of fuzzy sets, the core of fuzzy logic, 
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was first introduced by Lotfi A. Zadeh in 1965 [74]. 
A classical Boolean set A, may be equated with its characteristic function: 
߮஺: ܺ → ሼ0,1ሽ (3.1)
which associates with each element x of a universe of discourse X a number ߮ሺݔሻ ∈
ሼ0,1ሽ such that ߮ሺݔሻ ൌ 0 means that x does not belong to the set A, and ߮ሺݔሻ ൌ 1 means 
that x does not belong to the set A. 
 Unlike the classical Boolean set, elements of a fuzzy set may belong to it to 
partial degree, from full belongingness to the full nonbelongingness through all 
intermediate values. Thus the characteristic function can be rewritten as: 
߮஺: ܺ → ሾ0,1ሿ (3.2)
such that ߮ሺݔሻ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is the degree to which an element x belongs to the fuzzy set A. 
߮ሺݔሻ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is called the grade of membership [75].  
Similarly as in the classical Boolean set theory, the basic operations in fuzzy set 
theory are complement, intersection and union.  
The complement of a fuzzy set A in X, written as ൓ܣ, is defined as: 
ߤ൓஺ሺݔሻ ൌ 1 െ ߤ஺ሺݔሻ ∀ݔ ∈ ܺ     (3.3)
The complement corresponds to the negation ‘not’. 
 The intersection of two fuzzy sets A and B in X, written as ܣ ∩ ܤ, is defined as: 
ߤ஺∩஻ሺݔሻ ൌ ߤ஺ሺݔሻ⋀ߤ஻ሺݔሻ     (3.4)
where ‘⋀’ is usually a minimum operation, i.e. ܽ˄ܾ ൌ ݉݅݊	ሺܽ, ܾሻ. The intersection of 
two fuzzy sets corresponds to the connective ‘and’. 
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The union of two fuzzy sets A and B in X, written as ܣ ∪ ܤ, is defined as: 
ߤ஺∪஻ሺݔሻ ൌ ߤ஺ሺݔሻ⋁ߤ஻ሺݔሻ     (3.5)
where ‘⋁’ is usually a maximum operation, i.e. ܽ˅ܾ ൌ ݉ܽݔ	ሺܽ, ܾሻ. The intersection of 
two fuzzy sets corresponds to the connective ‘or’. 
In order to properly represent real-world knowledge where ambiguous, vague 
and imprecise data are involved, fuzzy rules have been used for knowledge 
representation [76]. A fuzzy rule is a rule describing the fuzzy relation between two 
propositions. Let R be a set of fuzzy rules ܴ ൌ ሼܴଵ, ܴଶ, … , ܴ௡ሽ. The general formulation 
of the ith fuzzy rule as follows: 
ܴ௜ሺܿ௜ሻ: IF	 ௝ܲ൫ߠ௝൯	THEN	 ௞ܲሺߠ௞ሻ		    
where ௝ܲ and ௞ܲ are propositions which may contion some fuzzy variables. The truth of 
each proposition, ߠ௝  and ߠ௞  are real values. ߠ௝ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ , ߠ௞ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ , ܿ௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ . It 
represents the strength of the belief in the rule. The larger the value is, the more the rule 
is believed in. 
 
3.2.3 Petri-nets 
Petri-nets technique was first introduced by Carl A. Petri in 1962. It is a 
graphical and mathematical tool. The graphical aspect allows easy representation of the 
interaction between discrete events: parallelism, synchronism, precedence, alternatives 
and so on. The mathematical aspect allows formal modeling of these interactions and 
analysis of the properties of the modeled system. A formal definition of Petri-nets is as 
follows [75]: 
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Let N be the set of natural numbers and zero. A Petri-nets is a 4-tuple: 
ሺܲ, ܶ, ܲݎ݁, ܲ݋ݏݐሻ 
where 
1. ܲ ൌ ሼ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሽ is a finite set of places. 
2. ܶ ൌ ሼݐଵ, ݐଶ, … , ݐ௡ሽ is a finite set of set of transitions. 
3. Pre is the input incidence function: 
ܲݎ݁: ܲ ൈ ܶ → ܰ 
4. Post is the output incidence function: 
ܲ݋ݏݐ: ܲ ൈ ܶ → ܰ 
In the graphical representation of a Petri-net, places are denoted by circles and 
transitions by bars. Places are the nodes describing the states (a place is a partial state) 
and the transitions depict the state changes. The Pre incidence function describes the 
directed arcs connecting places to transitions. ܲݎ݁ሺ݌, ݐሻ is the weight of the arc ሺ݌, ݐሻ. 
The absence of an arc between a place p and a transition t is denoted by ܲݎ݁ሺ݌, ݐሻ ൌ 0. 
The Post incidence function describes the directed arcs connecting transitions to places. 
ܲ݋ݏݐሺ݌, ݐሻ is the weight of the arc ሺݐ, ݌ሻ. The absence of an arc between a transition and 
a place is donated by ܲ݋ݏݐሺ݌, ݐሻ.  
In the metrical representation of a Petri-net, Pre is a ݊ ൈ݉ matrix of n rows (the 
places) and m columns (the transitions) whose elements belong to N. The vector 
ܲݎ݁ሺ∙, ݐሻ denotes the input arcs of transition t with their weights. Post is a ݊ ൈ݉ matrix 
of n rows (the places) and m columns (the transitions) whose elements belong to N. The 
vector ܲ݋ݏݐሺ∙, ݐሻ  denotes the output arcs of transition t with their weights. 
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3.3 Fault Section Estimation Module Establishment 
This Section proposes an advanced Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) 
diagnosis model after the structure adopted in [23]. This Intelligent Alarm Processor 
(IAP) model is expected to achieve the following goals: 
 Suppress multiple alarms from one event 
 Generate a single conclusion through logical cause-effect relationship 
 Automate the process to get answers quickly 
 Make graphical and numerical information concise and easy to follow 
3.3.1 Definitions 
Paper [77] has defined Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets as an 8-tuple: 
( , , , , , , , )P R I O H C    
where 
1) 1 2{ , , , }nP p p p   is a finite set of places or called propositions. 
2) 1 2{ , , , }mR r r r   is a finite set of transitions or called rules. 
3) : {0,1}I P R   is an n m  input matrix defining the directed arcs from 
propositions to rules. ( , ) 1i jI p r  , if there is a directed arc from ip  to jr , and 
( , ) 0i jI p r  , if there is no directed arcs from ip  to jr , for 1, 2, ,i n   and 1, 2, ,j m  . 
4) : {0,1}O P R   is an n m  output matrix defining the directed arcs from rules 
to propositions.  
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5) : {0,1}H P R   is an n m matrix defining the complementary arcs from 
propositions to rules. ( , ) 1i jH p r  , if there is a complementary arc from ip  to jr , and 
( , ) 0i jH p r  , if there is no directed arcs from ip  to jr , for 1, 2, ,  and 1, 2, ,i n j m   . 
6)    is a true degree vector. 1 2( , , )Tn     , where [0,1]   means the truth 
degree of ip , 1, 2,i n  . The initial truth degree vector is denoted by 0 . 
7) : {0,1}P   is a marking vector. 1 2( , , )Tn     . 1i  , if there is a token in 
ip , and 0i  , if ip  is not marked. An initial marking is denoted by 0 . 
8) 1 2{ , , }mC diag c c c  . ic  is the confidence of ir , 1, 2, ,j m  .  
The 5-tuple ( , , , , )P R I O H  is the basic FRPN structure that defines a directed 
graph. The updates of the truth degree vector   through execution of a set of rules 
describe the dynamic reasoning process of the modeled system. If the truth degree of a 
proposition is known at a certain reasoning step, a token is assigned to the corresponding 
proposition, which is associated with the value between 0 and 1. The token is 
represented by a dot. When a proposition ip  has no token, which means that the truth 
degree is unknown at that step, 0i  . 
 
3.3.2 Execution Rules 
In order to describe the execution rules of a FRPN, the following operators are 
used: 
1) : A B=D  , where A, B, and D are all m n - dimensional matrices, such that 
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max{ , }ij ij ijd a b .  
2) : A B=D  , where A, B, and D are all ( )m p , ( )p n , ( )m n - dimensional 
matrices, such that 
1max { }ij k p ij ijd a b   . 
The execution rules include enabling and firing rules. 
1) A rule jr R  is enabled if and only if ip  is marked, or 1i  , ip  {input 
propositions of jr }. 
2) Enabled at marking  , jr  firing results in a new ' . 
'( ) ( ) ( , ),                    jp p O p r p P      (3.6)
The truth degree vector changes from   to '  
'( ) ( ) ( , ),         j j j ip p c O p r p P         (3.7)
where 
min { | ,   ( , ) 1;  
                            =1-   ( , ) 1}
i i
j i i i i j
p r
i i i j
x x if I p r
x if H p r
 


  

 
 (3.8)
and 
{ | ( , ) 1  ( , ) 1,  }i i i j i j ir p I p r or H p r p P   
 
 (3.9)
3) All the enabled rules can fire at the same time. A firing vector   is 
introduced such that 1j  , if jr  fires. After firing a set of rules, the marking 
and truth degree vectors of the FRPN become 
' [ ]O      (3.10)
' [( ) ]O C       (3.11)
where 1 2( , , )
T
m     , which is called control vector. : {0,1}T   is the firing vector.  
 From Eq. (3.10) and Eq. (3.11), we notice that as long as ߤ and ߩ are known, the 
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next step marking and truth degree vectors can be derived from the current values. To 
obtain ߤ, an ‘neg’ operator is used. ߤ௞ can be calculated as follows: 
݊݁݃ߛ௞ ൌ 1௠ െ ߛ௞ ൌ ߛ௞തതത (3.12)
݊݁݃ߠ௞ ൌ 1௠ െ ߠ௞ ൌ ߠ௞തതത (3.13)
ߤ௞ ൌ ሺܫ ൅ ܪሻ்⨂ߛ௞തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത (3.14)
ߩ௞ ൌ ሺሺܫ்.∗ ்ܹሻ ∙ ߠ௞ ൅ ሺܪ்.∗ ்ܹሻ ∙ ߠ௞തതതሻ.∗ ߤ௞ (3.15)
where 1௠ ൌ ሺ1,1, … ,1ሻ் , k is the kth reasoning step, ݊݁݃ߠ௞ is an n-dimensional vector. 
Its components express the confidence of proposition ݌௜ being false at the kth reasoning 
step, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊. ߛ௞ is the marking. ߤ௞ is an m-dimensional firing vector. ߤ௞ ൌ 1, if  ݎ௝ 
is enabled, and ߤ௞ ൌ 0, if  ݎ௝ is not enabled, ݆ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉. W is the weight matrix. ߩ௞ is 
an m-dimensional control vector at the kth reasoning step. Its components express the 
truth degrees of enabled rule ݎ௝’s preconditions. ߩ௞ ൌ 0, if  ݎ௝ is not enabled. 
 From the Eq. (3.10) and Eq. (3.14), we get: 
ߛ௞ାଵ ൌ ߛ௞⨁ሾܱ⨂ሺܫ ൅ ܪሻ்⨂ߛ௞തതതሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത (3.15)
 From the Eq. (3.11) and Eq. (3.15), we get: 
ߠ௞ାଵ ൌ ߠ௞⨁ሺܱ ⋅ ܥሻ⨂ሺሺሺܫ்.∗ ்ܹሻ ∙ ߠ௞ ൅ ሺܪ்.∗ ்ܹሻ ∙ ߠ௞തതതሻ.∗ ߤ௞ሻሿ (3.15)
 To summarize, the FRPN algorithm can be described as follows: 
1. Read initial inputs ܫ, ܱ, ܪ, ܥ, ߛ଴ and ߠ଴. 
2. Let k=0. 
3. Compute ߛ௞ାଵ  from ߛ௞  according to Eq. (3.14); Compute ߠ௞ାଵ  from ߠ௞ 
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according to Eq. (3.15); 
4. If ߠ௞ାଵ ് ߠ௞	or	ߛ௞ାଵ ് ߛ௞ , let ݇ ൌ ݇ ൅ 1 and return to step 3; Otherwise, the 
reasoning is over. 
 
3.4 FRPN Model Implementation 
A 14-bus power system shown in Figure 12 is used for the study of fault section 
estimation problem. The system consists of 34 sections, including 14 buses and 20 
transmission lines. The buses are denoted as Bnn. The transmission lines are denoted as 
Lnnmm. 
The protection system of the 14-bus system consists of 174 protection devices, 
including 40 circuit breakers, 40 main transmission line relays, 40 primary backup 
transmission line relays and 40 secondary backup transmission line relays, and 14 bus 
relays. 
 
 
Figure 12   A 14-bus power system model 
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To explain the configuration and denotation of the protection system, a portion of 
the 14-bus power system is taken as an example as shown in Fig. 2. The portion includes 
a transmission line L1314, and its adjacent bus B13, B14 and adjacent transmission lines 
L1213, L0613, L0914. The main transmission line relay MLR1314 has forward 
protection zone and protects the entire line L1314. It will operate to trip its associated 
circuit breaker CB1314 to clear a fault on the line L1314. The bus relay BR13 protects 
the bus B13. It will operate to trip the circuit breakers CB1312, CB1306, CB1314 if a 
fault occurs on the bus B13. The primary backup transmission line relay BLR1314 is the 
local backup of the relay MLR1314 and has the same protection zone. If the fault 
clearance by the relay MLR1314 fails, the relay BLR1314 will operate to trip the circuit 
breaker CB1314 to clear the fault. Secondary backup transmission line relays SLR1213, 
SLR0613 are the remote backup of the relays MLR1314, BLR1314. If the fault 
clearance by both the relays MLR1314, BLR1314 fails, they will operate to trip their 
associated circuit breakers CB1213, CB0613, respectively, to clear the fault. The relays 
SLR1213, SLR0613 are also the remote backup of the relay BR13. If the fault clearance 
by the relay BR13 fails, they will operate to trip circuit breakers CB1213, CB0613, 
respectively, to clear the fault. The relays MLR1413, BLR1413, SLR0914, BR14 and 
circuit breakers CB1413, CB1409, CB0914 have similar roles in protecting the line 
L1314 and bus B14. The configuration and denotation of the protection system for other 
sections of the 14-bus power system are similar. 
When one or more faults occur on certain sections of the power system, 
protection devices will reach certain status accordingly. The observed circuit breaker 
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status signals obtained from RTUs of SCADA systems are used as inputs for estimation 
of the faulted sections. The logic reasoning method uses the relay status obtained from 
the online-database to validate each candidate fault section. The strategy is to build one 
FRPN diagnosis model for each section of the power system. Each model establishes 
reasoning starting from a set of SCADA data to the conclusion of fault occurrence on its 
associated section with certain truth degree value. 
 
 
Figure 13   Backward reasoning concept for structuring transmission line diagnosis 
models 
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We use backward reasoning concept to structure the FRPN diagnosis models and 
generalize the design for transmission lines and buses. Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate 
backward reasoning concept for structuring transmission line and bus diagnosis models 
respectively. The ‘AND-OR’ structure concisely represents all the possible combinations 
of main, primary backup and secondary backup protection operations for inferring a 
fault. 
 
 
Figure 14   Backward reasoning concept for structuring transmission bus diagnosis 
models 
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Based on the proposed structure, all the FRPN diagnosis models are developed. 
Each model establishes reasoning from a set of SCADA data to the conclusion of fault 
occurrence on its associated section with certain truth degree value. In case of single 
fault, the conclusion with the highest truth degree value is the final conclusion. As an 
example, Figure 15 shows the FRPN models for the transmission line L1314, and Figure 
16 shows the FRPN models for the bus B13. 
 
 
Figure 15   FRPN model for L1314 fault based on SCADA data 
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Figure 16   FRPN model for B13 fault based on SCADA data 
 
Moreover, each proposition is given a “truth degree value” to illustrate the 
strength of confirmation. We use a “weighted average” operation when calculating the 
truth degree value of a consequent proposition from the truth degree values of its 
antecedent propositions. Figure 19 illustrates the operation for r1 in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17   Example of “weighted average” operation 
 
The “weighted average” operation has two benefits. First, the relative 
significance of antecedent propositions in implicating the consequent proposition is 
recognized by the weights of antecedent propositions. This is particularly meaningful 
when the cause-effect relation among antecedent propositions is considered. In our 
assumption, circuit breaker opening is the effect of relay trip. The “circuit breaker 
opens” proposition is generally given larger weight than that of the “relay trips” 
proposition because circuit breaker opening indicates the completion of a protection 
operation more directly. For example, regarding the rule r3 in Figure 18, the proposition 
p5 “BLR1314 Trip” will be given a weight 0.4; the proposition p6 “CB1314 Open” will 
be given a weight 0.6. 
Second, the false data problem is effectively handled by averaging the truth 
degree values of antecedent propositions. For example, when the relay MLR1314 trips 
and the circuit breaker CB1314 opens as a consequence of a fault on the line L1314, and 
“MLR1314 Trip” is not observed, p15, which stands for “main protection operates”, will 
still get a moderate truth degree value instead of 0, hence a moderate truth degree value 
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for the final conclusion. It is apparent that the larger the number of input data, the impact 
of false data is more effectively countered. 
 
3.5 Deployment Strategy 
The fault section estimation application may be implemented in a control center 
to assist the system operator in rapidly identifying faulted sections for restoration 
process, as shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18   Overall fault estimation module structure 
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The fault section estimation application includes two stage analyses. 
 First Stage 
The system’s topology is analyzed based on circuit breaker status data from the 
real-time data base. The analysis includes all sections isolated by the opening of 
circuit breakers into a rough candidate set. The set is rough because it may include 
sections which are not faulted but are isolated due to backup relay operation. 
 Second Stage 
The Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net diagnosis model as well as data in the real-time 
data base corresponding to each section in the rough candidate set is used and 
Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net matrix operation is implemented. As a result, each 
section will be associated with a truth degree value. The section with a truth degree 
value greater than a certain threshold will be included in the refined candidate set. 
Such a refined candidate set is presented to the system operator for decision-
making? 
In such a solution, the FRPN models which are represented by various matrices 
are separated from FRPN matrix operations. This is analogous to an expert system 
whose rule base is separated from its inference engine. The FRPN models can be built in 
advance based on power system and protection system configurations and stored in files. 
In such a way, the FRPN models can be easily modified according to the changes of 
input data as well as power system and protection system configuration. 
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3.6 Case Study 
Case 1: 
A permanent fault occurred on the transmission line L0910 at 0.05 s. All of the 
protection devices operated correctly. No false data occurred. The observed SCADA 
data are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3   SCADA Data for Case 1  
Sequence No. Time Stamp (sec) Observed Signal 
1 0.1000 MLR0910 TRIP 
2 0.1000 MLR1009 TRIP 
3 0.2000 CB0910 OPEN 
4 0.2000 CB1009 OPEN 
 
Based on the SCADA data in Table 3, the only candidate for the fault section is 
estimated as the transmission line L0910, with a truth degree value 0.855. 
Case 2: 
A permanent fault occurred on the bus B04 at 0.05s. A second permanent fault 
occurred on the bus B09 at 0.09 s. All of the protection devices operated correctly. No 
false data occurred. The observed SCADA data are listed in Table 4. 
 
  
 50 
  
Table 4   SCADA Data for Case 2  
Sequence No. Time Stamp (sec) Observed Signal 
1 0.1000 BR04 TRIP 
2 0.1000 CB0402 OPEN 
3 0.2000 CB0403 OPEN 
4 0.2000 CB0405 OPEN 
5 0.2000 CB0407 OPEN 
6 0.2000 CB0409 OPEN 
7 0.2000 BR09 TRIP 
8 0.2000 CB0904 OPEN 
 
Based on the SCADA data in Table 4, the estimated fault sections are listed in 
Table 5.  
 
Table 5   Estimated Fault Sections based on SCADA DATA for Case 2  
No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value 
1 B04 0.855 
2 B09 0.855 
3 L0409 0.513 
 
Besides the buses B04 and B09, on which faults actually occur, the transmission 
line L0409, which has no fault, is included in the candidate set. The transmission line 
L0409 has a far small truth degree value than the other two candidates, which indicates 
very small possibility of fault occurrence. 
Case 3: 
A permanent fault occurred on the transmission line L1314 at 0.05 s. A second 
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permanent fault occurred on the bus B13 at 0.11 s. The circuit breakers CB1312 and 
CB1306 failed to open. The BR13 TRIP signal should be observed but it was not 
observed. The observed SCADA data are listed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6   SCADA Data for Case 3  
Sequence No. Time Stamp (sec) Observed Signal 
1 0.1000 MLR1314 TRIP 
2 0.1000 MLR1413 TRIP 
3 0.2000 CB1314 OPEN 
4 0.2000 CB1413 OPEN 
5 0.3000 BLR0613 TRIP 
6 0.3000 BLR1213 TRIP 
7 0.3000 CB0613 OPEN 
8 0.3000 CB1213 OPEN 
 
Based on the SCADA data in Table 6, the estimated fault sections are listed in 
Table 7.  
 
Table 7   Estimated Fault Sections based on SCADA DATA for Case 3  
No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value 
1 L1314 0.855 
2 B13 0.729 
  
Case 3 has additional complexity, because not only multiple faults but also 
protection device failure and false data are involved. However, with the proposed FRPN 
model, the actual fault sections can still be correctly identified.  
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3.7 Summary 
The traditional alarm processing approaches mostly rely on direct representation 
of raw alarm points, which becomes overwhelming to observe and interpret when 
operating the system under stressed conditions. This requires implementing new alarm 
processor to help the operator deal with the tremendous amount alarms by effectively 
converting raw data to useful information.  
In this Section, a Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) approach to solve the fault 
section estimation problem is proposed. The fundamental fault analysis techniques 
including backward reasoning, fuzzy logic and Petri-nets are reviewed first. The 
reasoning process can be graphically represented in a form of Petri-nets and 
implemented by matrix operations. Data acquired by RTUs of SCADA systems, 
including relay trip signals and circuit breaker status signals, are used as the inputs to the 
diagnosis models.  
The FRPN diagnosis model is analogous to an expert system whose rule-base is 
separated from its inference engine, which can be built in advance based on power 
system and protection system configurations and stored in files. In such a way, the 
FRPN models can be easily modified according to the changes of input data as well as 
power system and protection system configuration. 
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4. USE OF SUBSTATION IED DATA TO IMPROVE ALARM PROCESSING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Traditionally in a substation, supervisory control and data acquisition system 
(SCADA) data are typically bus voltages, flows (amps, MW, MVAR), frequency, 
breaker status, transformer tap position)  acquired using remote terminal units (RTUs) 
and sent to the energy management systems (EMS) in every two to ten seconds. With the 
rapid advancement of technology, Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) come into 
picture, such as Digital Protective Relay (DPR), Digital Fault Recorders (DFR), Phasor 
Measurement Units (PMU).  These modern day digital devices can record and store a 
huge amount of data with a periodicity depending upon the intended purpose of the 
device (DFRs only capture data during occurrence of a fault whereas PMUs take 
continuous time-synchronized data with high sampling rates). Thus we are having a 
great amount of data, which if used properly can become a great benefit for the EMS to 
predict, operate, monitor and post-mortem analyze power system events. 
This Section will firstly discuss about the characteristics of IED data and 
extraction of useful information from huge amount of redundant data. Then the next 
Section will show how the IED data integrated with SCADA can be applied in the FRPN 
model mentioned in Section 3 [78].  
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4.2 Substation IED Data 
In a modern day integrated substation, various types of IEDs are employed for 
monitoring and control purposes. Once the substation data at high power level are 
collected they must be transformed to instrumentation level using current and voltage 
instrument transformers. The data are then filtered and digitized, and submitted for the 
processing in IEDs. Finally, the intended information is extracted and supplied as output 
of these devices. This is the typical measurement data processing chain for the data. 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
The different measurement devices (collectively termed as sensors) that are 
source of data fall into the following categories: 
 Transducer 
 Relaying transformers 
 Metering transformers 
 Electronic (optical) transformers 
Traditionally, the data processing is done by substation RTUs. Nowadays the 
different IEDs used to process data in a typical substation are [79]: 
 Digital protective relay (DPR) 
 Digital fault recorder (DFR) 
 Phasor measurement units (PMUs) 
 Power quality meter (PQM) 
 Sequence of event recorder (SER) 
 Fault locator (FL) 
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 Circuit breaker monitor (CBM) 
 Programmable logic controller (PLC) 
 Remote terminal unit (RTU) 
These IEDs are intended for specific function (sometimes for multiple functions) 
and depending upon power system events IEDs record analog and/or status data either in 
a specific location or for the entire substation. 
Distortion in magnitude and phase angle of current and voltage signal is 
introduced in each stage of the measurement chain. Ideally the output waveform should 
be an exact replica of the input signal, but the error introduced in several stages make the 
output distorted. This Section is aimed at discussing the desired performance 
characteristics of the different stages in the measurement chain. 
 
4.2.2 Sensors 
Sensors (instrument transformers and transducers) measure current and voltage 
(for either metering or protection purposes) from high voltage electric circuit (primary 
side) and supply the RTUs or other IEDs (secondary side) these quantities proportional 
to those of the power circuit but in substantially reduced level and thereby provide 
galvanic isolation and signal scaling of signals for these devices from high voltage 
circuitry. Generally, conventional instrument transformers (current transformers CT, 
voltage transformers VT and capacitive coupled voltage transformers CCVT) are 
relatively inaccurate comparing to the microprocessor based IEDs. The accuracy of data 
is highly dependent on the accuracy of instrument transformers, control cables and 
 56 
  
burdens (the external load connected to secondary transformer terminals, including IEDs 
for this discussion). The detailed specification requirements can be found in IEEE 
standard C57.13 [80] and IEC standard 60044 [81]. 
 
4.2.3 Intelligent Electronic Devices 
Usually the microprocessor based IEDs have very good accuracy. While the 
basic data processing stages for IEDs are similar (as shown in Figure 19), the recording 
performance may differ. In all of the IEDs, the basic data processing steps are: 
 Galvanic isolation using auxiliary transformer 
 Low pass (anti-aliasing) filtering of the analog input waveforms to 
eliminate the high frequency components  
 Sampling of the analog input waveforms 
 Analog to Digital (A/D) conversion 
 Processing of the digital signal samples  
 
 
Figure 19   Data processing in IED 
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The overall accuracy of the IED analog signal input channel depends on several 
factors [82]: 
 Impact of auxiliary transformers 
 Mode of sampling 
 Anti-aliasing filtering 
 Sampling rate 
 Resolution of A/D conversion 
Some of the IEDs (DPR, DFR, FL etc) operate on synchronous sampling and 
some (RTU) operate on scanning of samples. As shown in Figure 20, when scanning, 
one analog input channel is sampled at a time and then converted to digital signal, 
whereas in synchronous sampling all the input channels are sampled at the same time 
and then they are converted to digital signal (there may be only one ADC serving all 
channels or each of the analog input channels has combined sample-and-hold circuit and 
ADC). Retrieving the actual phase difference between analog signals is easy in 
synchronous sampling as all signals are sampled at the same time. In case of 
synchronized sampling, the clock signal may be provided locally or from a receiver for 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) of satellites [83]. Most of the IEDs of modern day 
are using GPS for sampling and time stamping. 
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Figure 20   Scanning and synchronous sampling of analog inputs 
 
The replication of signal largely depends on the “horizontal” resolution 
(sampling rate) and “vertical” resolution (number of bits for ADC). With higher 
sampling rate, the better signal representation is achieved. With more bits, better signal 
accuracy is achieved). Sampling rate also affects the choice of anti-aliasing filters. DPR 
generally is a device with low sampling rate (16 samples/cycle i.e. 960Hz for 60Hz 
system). Some of the DFRs of modern day achieved much higher sampling rates of 48 
kHz. Again the higher value of vertical ADC resolution is desirable. Most of the IEDs 
use 16 bit ADC resolution. The selection of the resolution is driven by the ADC cost and 
dynamic behavior of the measured signal. 
While most of the other IEDs allow access to samples of signal, Phasor 
Measurement Unit (PMU) provides measurements of synchronous phasors of analog 
inputs. The GPS synchronized PMUs are the most accurate among all IEDs. Such GPS 
synchronized devices provide phasor data termed as synchrophasor. The IEEE C37.118 
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[84] is used for accuracy definition of synchrophasors:  
 Magnitude accuracy of 0.1% or better 
 Time accuracy better than 1 µs or phase angle accuracy of 0.02º at 60 Hz. 
 
4.2.4 Data Formats and Uses 
Getting required information from huge amount of redundant data obtained from 
different IEDs (having different data format) is an issue that requires particular attention 
[85]. Whenever the data from different IEDs is retrieved in a database, the data 
integration requires [86][87]:  
 Interpreting the data obtained from IEDs of different vendors 
 Exchanging data using standard COMTRADE file format [88] 
 Adding the static system configuration data according to the recorded 
data 
To integrate data among different IEDs and IEDs from different vendors, 
standardized data format is necessary. After the introduction of COMTRADE data 
format [88], most of the vendors are accepting this standardized data format, while some 
are still others are keeping their own native data formats [86]. The power quality meter 
data representation is standardized using Power Quality Data Interchange Format 
(PQDIF) [89]. Most recently, another useful standard has been adopted for 
representation of time-sequence data [90]. 
The use of data available from IEDs as well as the other data (SCADA data 
collected using RTUs, satellite data, and static system data) enhances some power 
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system functions.   
The basic idea is to collect all the data in a substation database and use further for 
extracting information automatically. This extracted information then may be used for 
several power system applications [91]. To import the IED data into the central 
repository requires means of data format conversion and communication among 
different IEDs. In addition to the automatically retrieved RTU and other IED data, the 
database should contain several other data, such as: 
 Static system data containing description of the system components and 
their connections (i.e. topology) 
 Substation interpretation data to correlate the naming convention between 
the recording devices and static system model 
 SCADA EMS PI Historian data to tune the static system model with real 
time data. 
By integrating data from all the sources, quality of data is improved due to the 
redundancy of the great amount of data collected. The next two Sections give examples 
of how the integration of data can benefit new applications. 
 
4.3 Enhanced FRPN Model with IED Data 
In a digital protective relay, the pickup and operation information of protection 
elements is usually in the form of logic operands. These logic operands are in essence 
digital bits, which can be directly transmitted in the form of register values via a digital 
communication system. The pickup and operation logic operands are more reliable than 
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SCADA data because they are more redundant and have less uncertainty than relay trip 
signals and circuit breaker status signals. They can be utilized to improve the accuracy of 
fault section estimation based on SCADA data. 
The detailed description of field needed for FRPN alarm processor is listed in 
Table 8.  
 
Table 8   Estimated Fault Sections based on SCADA DATA for Case 3  
Data from RTU of SCADA (Main data) 
1 CB status change alarms (Opening and Closing) 
2 Trip signal of Main Transmission Line Relays 
3 Trip signal of Primary Backup Transmission Line Relays 
4 Trip signal of Secondary Backup Transmission Line Relays 
5 Trip signal of Bus Relays 
Data from Digital Protective Relays (Additional Data) 
1 Pickup & Operation signals of Main Transmission Line Relays 
2 
Pickup & Operation signals of Primary Backup Transmission Line 
Relays 
3 
Pickup & Operation signals of Secondary Backup Transmission 
Line Relays 
4 Pickup & Operation signals of Bus Relays 
 
Figure 21 illustrates how the pickup and operation information is added into the 
FRPN model built for diagnosing a fault on the transmission line L1314. 
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Figure 21   FRPN model for L1314 fault based on SCADA data and digital protective 
relay data 
 
Take the reasoning process for the transmission line L1314 diagnosis model 
shown in Figure 17 as an example. The matrix representation of the model is given in 
Figure 22. 
When a fault occurs on the line L1314, its associated protection system operated 
to respond to the fault. The following signals are observed in SCADA data: SLR0613 
Trip, CB0613 Open, SLR1213 Trip, CB1213 Open, BLR1314 Trip, 
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Figure 22   Matrix representation for FPRN model L1314 
 
MLR1314 Trip, MLR1413 Trip and CB1413 Open. 0  and 0  are given as: 
0 [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]T   
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0 [0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]T   
 The first reasoning step will result in 
1 [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0]T   
1 [0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 
        0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026 0 0 0 0]T
 
 
The second reasoning step will result in 
2 [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0]T   
2 [0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 
        0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026 0.791 0.342 0.855 0]T
 
 
The third reasoning step will result in 
3 [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]T   
3 [0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 
        0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026 0.791 0.791 0.855 0.599]T
 
 
The final reasoning step will result in 
4 [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]T   
4 [0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 
        0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026 0.791 0.791 0.855 0.823]T
 
 
So the conclusion will be that a fault occurred on the transmission line L1314 
with a truth degree value 0.823. 
Taking the same example as above, if MLR1413 Trip is missing in the SCADA 
data due to data transmission error, the conclusion will be that a fault occurred on the 
transmission line L1314 with a truth degree value 0.652. 
The matrix representation of the FRPN model described by Figure 21 can be 
easily generated based on the matrix representation of the FRPN model described by 
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Figure 15. The updated matrices , , ,I O H W , are given in Figure 23. There is no change 
on matrix C . The weight assignment in W  is adjusted to reflect the relative significance 
of input signals in determination of the occurrence of a protection operation. The 
operation of relay element has the largest weight and the pickup of relay element has the 
second largest weight. The relay trip and the circuit breaker opening have smaller 
weights. When the absence of the circuit breaker opening for the main protection and 
primary backup protection is taken into consideration of the secondary backup 
protection, it has the largest weight. 
 
 
Figure 23   Updated matrix representation for FPRN model L1314 
 
Take the same example as in previous Section. When a fault occurs on the 
transmission line L1314, its associated protection system operated to respond to the 
fault. In addition to the observed SCADA data, the following relay signals are also 
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observed: SLR0613 Pickup, SLR0613 Operation, SLR1213 Pickup, SLR1213 
Operation, BLR1314 Pickup, BLR1314 Operation, MLR1314 Pickup, MLR1314 
Operation, MLR1413 Pickup, MLR1413 Operation, BLR1413 Pickup, SLR0914 Pickup. 
Since the relay data are more reliable than the SCADA data, they are given a larger truth 
value 0.98. 0  and 0  are given as: 
0 [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]T   
0 [0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0]T
 
 
The final conclusion will be that a fault occurs on the transmission line L1314 
with a truth degree value 0.848. 
Taking the same example as above, if MLR1413 Trip is missing in the SCADA 
data due to data transmission error while MLR1413 Pickup and MLR1413 Operation are 
observed, the conclusion will be that a fault occurs on the transmission line L1314 with a 
truth degree value 0.827. 
 
4.4 Case Study 
Case 1: 
A permanent fault occurred on the transmission line L0910 at 0.05 s. All of the 
protection devices operated correctly. No false data occurred. The observed SCADA 
data are listed in Table 3, and the observed digital protective relay data are listed in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9   Digital Protective Relay Data for Case 1  
Sequence No. Time Stamp (sec) Observed Signal 
1 0.0662 SLR0409 PKP 
2 0.0677 SLR0709 PKP 
3 0.0693 BLR0910 PKP 
4 0.0698 MLR0910 PKP 
5 0.0703 MLR1009 PKP 
6 0.0703 BLR1009 PKP 
7 0.0703 SLR1110 PKP 
8 0.0724 SLR1409 PKP 
9 0.0740 MLR0910 OP 
10 0.0745 MLR1009 OP 
 
Based on the SCADA data and additional digital protective relay data, the only 
candidate for the fault section is estimated as the transmission line L0910, with a truth 
degree value 0.882.  
Case 2: 
A permanent fault occurred on the bus B04 at 0.05s. A second permanent fault 
occurred on the bus B09 at 0.09 s. All of the protection devices operated correctly. No 
false data occurred. The observed SCADA data are listed in Table 4, and the observed 
digital protective relay data are listed in Table 10. 
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Table 10   Digital Protective Relay Data for Case 2  
Sequence No. Time Stamp (sec) Observed Signal 
1 0.0537 BR04 PKP 
2 0.0625 SLR0304 PKP 
3 0.0651 SLR0904 PKP 
4 0.0677 SLR0204 PKP 
5 0.0667 SLR0504 PKP 
6 0.0677 SLR0704 PKP 
7 0.0703 BLR0704 PKP 
8 0.0703 BLR0904 PKP 
9 0.0766 BLR0204 PKP 
10 0.0766 BLR0504 PKP 
11 0.0771 BLR0304 PKP 
12 0.0938 BR09 PKP 
13 0.0964 SLR0709 PKP 
14 0.1000 BR04 OP 
15 0.1063 BLR0709 PKP 
16 0.1115 SLR1009 PKP 
17 0.1115 SLR1409 PKP 
18 0.1115 SLR0409 PKP 
19 0.1224 BLR1009 PKP 
20 0.1224 BLR1409 PKP 
21 0.1224 BLR0409 PKP 
22 0.1401 BR09 OP 
 
 
Based on the SCADA and additional digital protective relay data, the estimated 
fault sections are listed in Table 11.  
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Table 11   Estimated Fault Sections based on SCADA and Digital Protective Relay 
DATA for Case 2  
No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value 
1 B04 0.882 
2 B09 0.882 
3 L0409 0.618 
 
Besides the buses B04 and B09, on which faults actually occur, the transmission 
line L0409, which has no fault, is included in the candidate set. The transmission line 
L0409 has a far small truth degree value than the other two candidates, which indicates 
very small possibility of fault occurrence. 
Case 3: 
A permanent fault occurred on the transmission line L1314 at 0.05 s. A second 
permanent fault occurred on the bus B13 at 0.11 s. The circuit breakers CB1312 and 
CB1306 failed to open. The BR13 TRIP signal should be observed but it was not 
observed. The observed SCADA data are listed in Table 6, and the observed digital 
protective relay data are listed in Table 12. 
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Table 12   Digital Protective Relay Data for Case 3  
Sequence No. Time Stamp (sec) Observed Signal 
1 0.0641 SLR1314 PKP 
2 0.0651 SLR1413 PKP 
3 0.0683 BLR0904 PKP 
4 0.0688 BLR0204 PKP 
5 0.0693 SLR0504 PKP 
6 0.0698 MLR0704 PKP 
7 0.0698 MLR0704 PKP 
8 0.0703 SLR0904 PKP 
9 0.0703 SLR0204 PKP 
10 0.0740 MLR0504 PKP 
11 0.0740 MLR0304 PKP 
12 0.1141 BR13 PKP 
13 0.1193 SLR0613 PKP 
14 0.1204 SLR1213 PKP 
15 0.1271 BLR0613 PKP 
16 0.1297 BLR1213 PKP 
17 0.1605 BR13 OP 
18 0.2433 BLR0613 OP 
19 0.2459 BLR1213 OP 
 
 
Based on the SCADA data and additional digital protective relay data, the 
estimated fault sections are listed in Table 13.  
 
Table 13   Estimated Fault Sections based on SCADA and Digital Protective Relay 
DATA for Case 3  
No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value 
1 L1314 0.882 
2 B13 0.854 
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The transmission line L1314 and bus B13 faults are correctly identified and 
included in the candidate set. The use of DPR data increases the truth degree values for 
all candidates. It should be noted that in the previous case 3 in Section 3 with SCADA 
data only, B13 fault only has a truth degree value of 0.729 due to the missing and false 
data, and now it increases to 0.854 which is a more convincing result. 
 
4.5 Summary 
This Section discusses the performance characteristics of the substation IED data 
measurement chain by focusing on industry standards for the instruments used. It also 
focuses how efficiently substation IED data along with the traditional SCADA data and 
other available data can be integrated to enhance certain power system functions by 
automatically retrieving information from substation database.  
It can be concluded that major enhancements in performance of FRPN model can 
be achieved by integrating digital protective relay data even with missing or false alarm 
signals.  
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5. RELIABILITY AND LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT BREAKER 
 
5.1 Introduction 
After the discussion of the implementation of the Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets 
model in the fault section estimation module, it is noted that the accuracy of the input 
data plays a vital role in the overall analyzing procedure. It is almost evitable that 
protection devices sometimes may fail to operate normally, which means for instance, a 
circuit breaker keeps opening/closing when it is supposed to close/open, or a relay fails 
to trip when it is supposed to do so. Though the FRPN model has the fault-data-tolerant 
capability to some extent, it would be better if we could correctly identify the reliability 
index or truth degree value of each individual protection device as an input. And when 
protection devices failed or are about to fail, we have to initiate a maintenance strategy.  
Therefore, how to make decisions to optimally allocate the resources by deciding 
when to perform maintenance on power apparatus becomes a critical issue, especially 
with present economic scenario in power industry.  
Power industry is gradually changing from scheduled maintenance to  “as 
needed” or “just-in-time” maintenance, which means that it is important not to “over 
maintain” the equipment. Also, if too little maintenance is done on the equipment, it may 
fail due to wear and deterioration. Even when maintenance is performed, the inadequate 
type of maintenance will not improve the condition of the equipment. The attention must 
be put on the troubled area. Otherwise unnecessary maintenance action is simply a waste 
of time, effort and money [92]. 
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An effective maintenance that can reduce the frequency of service interruptions 
and the many undesirable consequences of such interruptions is in great need. 
Commonly used maintenance strategies are reviewed and reported in [93]. These 
approaches range from scheduled maintenance to reliability-centered maintenance 
(RCM) and condition based maintenance (CBM) [94]-[98]. RCM allows modeling the 
component deterioration process and linking it to the condition of the device [99][100]. 
These models are further developed for circuit breakers and transformers with objective 
being determination of the Mean Time to First Failure (MTTFF), estimation of the 
failure probability and prediction of cost reduction [101]-[103].  
In failure models, the deterioration process is represented by a sequence of stages 
of increasing wear, finally leading to equipment failure. Deterioration is of course a 
continuous process in time and only for the purposes of easier modeling is it considered 
in discrete steps. The common way to define deterioration stage is by duration, e.g. the 
second stage is reached, on average, in three years, the third in six, and so on. The 
problem with this approach is that the mean time is usually obtained from a large amount 
of historical data from many circuit breakers that are working under different operation 
environment, such as temperature, humidity, open/close frequency, different level of 
rated voltages and current, etc. The deviation among CBs may impede an attempt to 
determine the stage of deterioration. Since the mean times between the stages are usually 
uneven, they are selected from performance data or by judgment based on experience.  
Under a predictive maintenance model, maintenance is carried out as needed. 
The need for maintenance is established through condition monitoring which is the on-
 74 
  
going inspection and surveillance of the operation of equipment to ensure proper 
performance and to detect abnormalities indicative of approaching failure. Reverences 
[104][105] have proposed a methodology utilizing the control circuit data of CB to 
define several performance indices. Time instants in the waveforms captured from the 
control circuit when CB operates (either open or close operation) to reflect the 
health/condition of various assemblies such as trip coil, close coil, auxiliary contacts etc. 
are used. The disadvantage of the previous method is that it uses only two maintenance 
state: healthy and failure. This ignores the possibility that different types of maintenance 
can be done to correct specific problems. With the inclusion of more than one 
maintenance state, a maintenance model can be more sufficiently applied to practical 
situations. 
To overcome the deficiency, this Section proposes methodology suitable for 
practical applications and it can be applied in real time using field measured condition-
based data. Though this Section only focuses on circuit breaker monitoring, this 
approach can be extended to relay, transformer and other devices as well. 
 
5.2 Life Cycle Model using Condition-based Data  
5.2.1 Condition-based Data 
According to the failure survey conducted by CIGRE Working Group A3.12, 
majority of CB failures are due to malfunction of operating mechanism and control 
circuit in that order compared to other CB assemblies [106]. The condition monitoring 
techniques are relatively easy to develop since the secondary circuit is readily accessible 
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for on-line monitoring. There are portable test devices available on the market to collect 
and display the control circuit signals which are analog and/or digital waveforms [107]. 
A low cost circuit breaker monitor (CBM) developed for recording and automated 
analysis of condition-based data both offline and online is reported in [108]. Signal 
processing and expert system modules for extracting the exact timings of the signal 
parameters for both open and close operations are implemented in [109]. The list of 
events, corresponding definitions and timing parameters are presented in Table 14 [109]. 
Based on the preliminary research done in [104], only timing parameters t2-t6 are 
considered in this paper. 
 
Table 14   List of Event and Signal Parameters  
Event Event Description Signal Parameter 
1 Trip of close operation is initiated t1 
2 Trip coil current picks up t2 
3 Trip coil current dips after saturation t3 
4 Trip coil current drops off t4 
5 
B contact breaks  or makes (a change of status 
from low to high or vice vresa) 
t5 
6 A contact breaks or makes t6 
7 Phase current breaks or makes t7 
 
5.2.2 Probability Distribution 
A normal distribution is assumed for all signal parameters for the purpose of 
illustration. The probability distribution of signal parameter t2 is shown in Figure 24. To 
proceed with the methodology, three bands for each timing parameter are defined: 
healthy, minor deterioration and major deterioration. If one new value of ti falls in the 
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“healthy” range, then it indicates that those parts of the breaker which cause the 
occurrence of time instant ti operate properly. One new value of ti falls in the second band 
means that the associated parts respond with some delays and may be in the minor 
deterioration. If one new value of ti falls in the third range that suggests that the 
associated parts can’t respond in time and may be in the major deterioration stage. To be 
more specific, for instance, if t2 falls out all of three ranges, it means that there is some 
problem associated with the close coil. These limits are specific to each circuit breaker 
and can be determined once and for all. 
 
Healthy
Minor 
Deterioration
Major 
Deterioration
Time (msec)
Probability Distribution of t2
Lower
Limit
Upper Limit
for major 
deterioration
Upper Limit
for minor 
deterioration
Upper Limit 
for health 
condition
 
Figure 24   Probability distribution of parameter t2 
 77 
  
In general, probability that breaker operates correctly with respect to ti is defined 
as ݌ሺݐ௜ଵሻ ൌ Pr	ሺ݈௜ ൑ ݐ௜ ൑ ݑ௜ଵሻ , ݌ሺݐ௜ଶሻ ൌ Pr	ሺݑ௜ଵ ൑ ݐ௜ ൑ ݑ௜ଶሻ , ݌ሺݐ௜ଷሻ ൌ Pr	ሺݑ௜ଶ ൑ ݐ௜ ൑ ݑ௜ଷሻ , 
where ݈௜ is the lower limit and ݑ௜ is the upper limit, superscript 1,2,3 denotes the three 
stages: healthy condition, minor deterioration and major deterioration respectively. 
Those probabilities are used to define performance indices for various part assemblies of 
circuit breaker. 
 
5.2.3 Condition Assessment 
Reference [104] has listed five part assemblies.  
 Performance of trip and close coils 
A sample representation of trip coil current is shown in Figure 25. After the trip 
initiate is active, the coil current makes a gradual transition to a nonzero value at time 
‘t2’. The time instant ‘t3’ corresponds the time at which the operating mechanism starts 
moving with the help of trip coil energy. The coil current starts dropping down to zero at 
time ‘t4’. The trip coil current signals should be fairly smooth except for the dips at the 
beginning and end of the waveform. 
Possible abnormalities associated with trip coil include: pick up delayed, dip 
delayed, drop-off delayed, etc. In worst case, these abnormalities may result in breaker 
not opening when it is supposed to. These abnormalities can be addressed by 
probabilities p(t2), p(t3) and p(t4) corresponding to the timing parameter t2, t3 and t4. 
These time instants should occur within the tolerance limits to assure proper operation of 
trip coils. The performance index related to trip coil is defined as the probability that trip 
 78 
  
coil fails to operate properly, 
݌௙ሺܶܥሻ ൌ 1 െ ݌ሺݐଶሻ݌ሺݐଷሻ݌ሺݐସሻ (5.1)
  
 
Figure 25   Trip coil current during openning 
 
 Performance of auxiliary contacts 
As the breaker opens its main contacts, it also changes the status of the auxiliary 
‘a’ and ‘b’ contacts as shown in Figure 26. Some possible abnormalities associated with 
operation of ‘a’ and ‘b’ contacts are: delay in transition, premature transition, unstable 
contacts, noise and contacts bounce. If the timings t5 and t6 fall within their tolerance 
limits, we can say the auxiliary contacts operate normally. The performance index 
related to auxiliary contacts can be defined as, the probability that auxiliary contacts fails 
to operate properly, 
݌௙ሺܣܤሻ ൌ 1 െ ݌ሺݐହሻ݌ሺݐ଺ሻ (5.2)
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Figure 26   ‘a’ and ‘b’ contacts transistion during close operation 
 
 Performance of operating mechanism 
The time period between the instant at which the TC rises (t2) and the instant at 
which the dip occurs (t3) is the ‘free travel time’ that equals to |t3 – t2|. This free travel 
time reflects the performance of the trip latch mechanism. The timings t2 and t3 need to 
fall in the tolerance limits for the breaker to have normal free travel time. Any violation 
reflects an improper operation of trip latch mechanism. The corresponding performance 
index is defined as the probability that free travel time is abnormal, 
݌௙ሺܨܶሻ ൌ 1 െ ݌ሺݐଶሻ݌ሺݐଷሻ (5.3)
The coil current also needs to correlate with the event of ‘a’ or ‘b’ contact 
changes. The time period between the dip and the change of ‘a’ for opening is the 
mechanism travel time which is equal to |t6 – t3| for opening [110]. For normal 
‘mechanism travel time’, the timings t5 and t6 need to fall in corresponding tolerance 
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limits. Any violation of these timings can be reported as abnormal operation of breaker. 
The corresponding performance index is defined as the probability that the mechanism 
travel time is abnormal, 
݌௙ሺܯܶሻ ൌ 1 െ ݌ሺݐଷሻ݌ሺݐ଺ሻ (5.4)
 Performance of breaker 
In addition to the performance of individual components of breaker, an overall 
performance of the breaker may be assessed. If none of the timings t2 to t6 is violated, we 
can say that breaker operates properly. If any of these timings falls out the corresponding 
tolerance limits, we can say that the breaker fails to operate properly. This quantity can 
be defined as probability that the breaker does not operate properly and is estimated as, 
݌௙ሺܤݎሻ ൌ 1 െෑ݌ሺݐ௜ሻ
଺
௜ୀଶ
 (5.5)
A summary of all performance indices for CB opening is given below in Table 
15. 
 
Table 15   CB Opening Performance Indices 
Operation Performance index Performance 
Open 
pf(TC) Trip coil 
pf(AB) Auxiliary ‘a’ and ‘b’ contacts 
pf(FT) Trip latch mechanism 
pf(MT) Operating mechanism 
pf(Br) Breaker as a whole 
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5.3 Model Development 
5.3.1 Assumptions 
The proposed model is built based on the following assumptions: 
1) Only if all the time instants are within the health condition range, the associated 
component is considered being in the health stage. 
2) If one or more time instants are within the minor deterioration range, the 
associated component is considered being in the minor deterioration stage. 
3) If one or more time instants are within the major deterioration range, the 
associated component is considered being in the major deterioration stage. 
4) If one or more time instants are in the fault range, the associated component is 
considered being in the failure stage. If one component or the breaker as a whole 
is in a failure stage, it may respond very slowly or it may get stuck. 
5) The component will not recover to the previous stage automatically without 
proper maintenance.  
Therefore, to determine the life cycle stage of specific part assemblies, equations 
(5.1)-(5.5) can be extended as: 
Trip coil: 
݌௙ሺܶܥ௙ሻ ൌ 1 െ෍݌ሺݐଶ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐସ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 (5.6.1)
݌௙ሺܶܥଷሻ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܶܥ௙ሻቁ െ෍݌ሺݐଶ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐସ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
(5.6.2)
݌௙ሺܶܥଶሻ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܶܥ௙ሻ െ ݌௙ሺܶܥଷሻቁ െ ݌ሺݐଶଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐସଵሻ (5.6.3)
݌௙ሺܶܥଵሻ ൌ ݌ሺݐଶଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐସଵሻ (5.6.4)
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Auxiliary contacts: 
݌௙ሺܣܤ௙ሻ ൌ 1 െ෍݌ሺݐହ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐ଺௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 (5.7.1)
݌௙ሺܣܤଷሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌௙ሺܣܤ௙ሻሻ െ෍݌ሺݐହ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐ଺௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
(5.7.2)
݌௙ሺܣܤଶሻ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܣܤ௙ሻ െ ݌௙ሺܣܤଷሻቁ െ ݌ሺݐହଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐ଺ଵሻ (5.7.3)
݌௙ሺܣܤଵሻ ൌ ݌ሺݐହଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐ଺ଵሻ	 (5.7.4)
Trip latch mechanism: 
݌௙ሺܨܶ௙ሻ ൌ 1 െ෍݌ሺݐଶ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 (5.8.1)
݌௙ሺܨܶଷሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌௙ሺܨܶ௙ሻሻ െ෍݌ሺݐଶ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
(5.8.2)
݌௙൫ܨܶଶ൯ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܨܶ௙ሻ െ ݌௙ሺܨܶଷሻቁ െ ݌ሺݐଶଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ (5.8.3)
݌௙ሺܨܶଵሻ ൌ ݌ሺݐଶଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ	 (5.8.4)
Operating mechanism: 
݌௙ሺܯܶ௙ሻ ൌ 1 െ෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐ଺௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 (5.9.1)
݌௙ሺܯܶଷሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌௙ሺܯܶ௙ሻሻ െ෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐ଺௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
(5.9.2)
݌௙ሺܯܶଶሻ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܯܶ௙ሻ െ ݌௙ሺܯܶଷሻቁ െ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐ଺ଵሻ (5.9.3)
݌௙ሺܯܶଵሻ ൌ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐ଺ଵሻ	 (5.9.4)
Breaker as a whole: 
݌௙ሺܤݎ௙ሻ ൌ 1 െ෍݌ሺݐଶ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐସ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐହ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐ଺௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 (5.10.1)
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݌௙ሺܤݎଷሻ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܤݎ௙ሻቁ െ෍݌ሺݐଶ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐଷ௝ሻ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐସ௝ሻ ∙෍݌ሺݐହ௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
∙෍݌ሺݐ଺௝ሻ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
(5.10.2)
݌௙ሺܤݎଶሻ ൌ ቀ1 െ ݌௙ሺܤݎ௙ሻ െ ݌௙ሺܤݎଷሻቁ െ ݌ሺݐଶଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐସଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐହଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐ଺ଵሻ	 (5.10.3)
݌௙ሺܤݎଵሻ ൌ ݌ሺݐଶଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐଷଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐସଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐହଵሻ ∙ ݌ሺݐ଺ଵሻ (5.10.4)
 
where the superscript f denotes the failure stage and the other superscripts 1,2,3 denotes 
the three stages of healthy condition, minor deterioration and major deterioration 
respectively. 
 
5.3.2 Development Steps 
The general model development has the following steps: 
1) Capture history of CB control signal changes and extract timings of each signal 
parameter using signal processing module. 
2) Analyze the relationship between the parameters and fit a probability distribution 
to each parameter. 
3) Define performance indices using these distributions to assess the conditions 
(health, minor/major deterioration, failure) of the breaker. 
4) As the new data arrives, update the distribution and performance indices.  
In the last step, since the normal distribution is selected to fit all the signal 
parameters, the distribution is updated by updating the mean and variance of the time 
instances. We write: 
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ܺ~ܰሺߤ, ߪଶሻ (5.11.1)
or  
݂ሺݔ; ߤ, ߪଶሻ ൌ ଵ√ଶగఙమ ݁
షሺೣషഋሻమ
మ഑మ , for x =  t2,  t3,  t4,  t5,  t6 (5.11.2)
The flowchart of the CB assessing model is shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27   Model flowchart for assessing the CB conditions 
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5.4 Case Study 
To illustrate the proposed methodology, history of each signal parameter is 
developed using the waveforms taken from control circuit of a GE circuit breaker. 
Detailed data sets can be found in the Appendix A. The tolerance limits for operation in 
[109] have been further divided into three bands, as shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16   Tolerance Limits for CB Open Operation 
Event (ms) Lower limit 
Upper limit for 
health 
condition 
Upper limit for 
minor 
deterioration 
Upper limit for 
major 
deterioration 
t2 0.00 1.00 1.50 2.00 
t3 13.6 16.1 17.4 18.6 
t4 26.4 30.9 33.2 35.4 
t5 28.7 33.7 36.3 38.7 
t6 22.4 27.4 29.9 32.4 
 
The computed performance indices are shown in the Figure 28 to Figure 32. 
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Figure 28   Performance indices for TC 
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Figure 29   Performance indices for AB 
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Figure 30   Performance indices for FT 
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Figure 31   Performance indices for MT 
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Figure 32   Performance indices for Br 
 
It is observed that only the auxiliary contacts are functioning well and lie in the 
minor deterioration stage. The performance index p(Br), which depicts the whole 
breaker is certainly on the edge of failure due to the abnormal operation of trip coil, trip 
latch and operation mechanism. A major maintenance is in urgent need. Based on these 
performance probabilities, we get easily apply them to the ‘classical’ life cycle model, as 
shown in Figure 33. 
 
Health  Minor D
Major 
D  Failure 
0.28% 13.21% 24.40% 62.11%
M1 M2 M3
 
Figure 33   Assessing life cycle stages 
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The method proposed in this Section uses real-time condition-based monitoring 
data and provides a probability to each deterioration stage, which is more reliable than 
the traditional ‘mean time’ criteria. 
 
5.5 Summary 
A new methodology to assess the circuit breakers’ life cycle using condition-
based data is proposed in this paper. In addition to confirming that the case study 
analysis results are in accordance with the test results in Reference [104], this approach 
also gives a probability of circuit breaker in each deterioration stage in real time. 
Another advantage of the proposed failure probability index is that it gives insight into 
which component of the breaker is causing the problem instead of just reporting the 
failure rate (number of failures per year). Knowing the CB’s exact troubled area and its 
deterioration stage is very important to making appropriate maintenance strategies since 
difference maintenance policies’ may have different cost that varies a lot. 
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6. CONTIGENCY-BASED NODAL MARKET OPERATION USING INTELLIGENT 
ECONOMIC ALARM PROCESSOR* 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Section focuses on the system monitoring and the use of alarm processing 
for economic decision in the nodal electricity market. The concept of an Intelligent 
Economic Alarm Processor (IEAP) is proposed to analyze thousands of alarm messages 
and extract useful information that explains cause-effect sequences associated with the 
unexpected contingencies. A graphical Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) model that 
uses fuzzy logic parameters to effectively tackle the uncertainties is built. The economic 
alarm processor module then processes the fault event signal, analyzes the impact on the 
market activities, and gives recommendations to optimize the total economic impact 
under fault scenarios.  
The independent system operator (ISO) maintains the instantaneous power 
balance in the system. Its basic responsibilities include monitoring system security 
functions and re-dispatching generation as necessary to eliminate real-time transmission 
congestion and maintain system reliability. This includes taking all necessary emergency 
actions to maintain the system security in both normal and abnormal operating 
conditions.  
                                                 
* Part of the material in this section is reprinted from “Contingency-based Nodal Market Operation Using 
Intelligent Economic Alarm processor,” by Yufan Guan, and Mladen Kezunovic, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 540-548, March 2013. DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2012.2223722 2013 IEEE, with permission 
from IEEE. 
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Based on the assumption that the system reliability is not immediately threatened 
when certain fault event occurs in the system, our proposed IEAP model will give 
operators and other market participants advance notice of an imminent need to serve 
scheduled loads, find replacement for the transmission transfer capacity, or meet 
service’s needs.  
 
6.2 Integration of Conventional Alarm Processing and Economic Alarms 
An alarm, in general, is a mechanism by which a large amount of data is 
processed in a way that discards the detailed information but retains information to 
which the operator must attend. The alarms would alert these persons of incipient 
problematic conditions that may impede effective power market operation. The basic 
concept is that public information is attainable in providing market participants and 
operators with alarms based on economic information and trends. It is important to note 
that system reliability versus system economics is an issue that does not appear to be 
fully resolved [28]. 
The concept of power system economic alarms can be defined in two different 
areas. 
 Economic alarms for system operators to augment conventional electric 
alarms. This type of alarm includes: the identification of operating conditions 
that limit the effective transfer of power among purchasing and selling 
entities; conditions such that further contingencies will limit market sales and 
potentially curtail scheduled transactions; identification of stresses in the bulk 
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transmission network beyond which operators are uncomfortable; and 
generation and transmission contingencies that may cause degradation of 
efficient market transactions. 
 Economic alarms for all market participants to monitor system state and 
signal significant changes in trends for LMPs, line loading, and system/bus 
demands. This type of alarm would rely upon the use of analysis software 
(load flow studies, contingency analysis, real-time stability analysis and state 
estimation) to obtain the present economic picture of a power system. Thus 
near term trends in LMPs, line loading, and bus demands may alert market 
participants of economic opportunities.  
Economic alarms have the potential to alert the operator of electric network 
economic implications. These economic impacts can range from small value transactions 
to large scale transmission transactions with concomitant high dollar value. The 
philosophical base of alarms is the identification of measurement and other data that are 
“out of range.” In power engineering, alarms are usually based on a complex 
combination of measurement and other data. Identification of the economic impact of 
events could alter how operators correct the present state of the system so that revenue is 
optimized, and schedules and power market contracts are effectively implemented. 
The Intelligent Economic Alarm Processor (IEAP) proposed in this work can be 
implemented in a control center to assist the grid operator in rapidly identifying faulted 
sections and managing market operation. The structure of the application as well as its 
SCADA support infrastructure is illustrated in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34   Intelligent economic alarm processor structure 
 
In such a solution, input data such as relay trip signals and circuit breaker status 
signals are acquired by RTUs of the SCADA system. In the control center, the SCADA 
master computer puts the input data into a real-time database and keeps updating them at 
each scan time.  
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The IEAP application includes two modules, Fault Section Estimation 
Application and Economic Alarm Processor. In the first module, the Fuzzy Reasoning 
Petri-net (FRPN) diagnosis model and data in the real-time database corresponding to 
each section in the rough candidate set are used. Each section is associated with a truth 
degree value (the possibility of fault occurrence). The section with a truth degree value 
greater than a certain threshold is included in the refined fault candidate set. Such a 
refined fault candidate set is presented to the system operator for decision-making. 
When market participants receive the system and market data in advance, they 
make estimation about the system operator's restorative action and their competitors' 
reaction to it. The general contingency-based strategic bidding model assumes that all 
the suppliers' and consumers' bids follow a linear function, and will adjust the bidding 
coefficients of competitors accordingly [112][113]. 
 
6.3 Economic Alarm Processor Module 
 As discussed in Section 3 and  Section 4, once the fault section estimation 
module detects a fault in certain region, the economic alarm processor  firstly checks if 
there is any thermal violations and calculates the changes in the LMPs, total generation 
cost and congestion revenue etc. Then it gives some suggested re-dispatch actions to 
optimize the whole system. The objective of the module is to minimize the total 
generation cost. Since the market transactions have already been scheduled prior to the 
fault event, we may consider the demand is perfectly inelastic, thus minimizing the total 
cost is the same as maximizing the total social welfare. Therefore, the problem can be 
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written as: 
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(6.1)
PGi is the generation from generator i, and NG is the total number of generators. 
PLj is the demand for each load j, and NL is the total number of loads. Ci is the generation 
cost for generator i, and Fij denotes the power flow from bus i to bus j. zij=1 when lineij 
is operating normally, zij=0 when a fault is detected on lineij. To simply demonstrate the 
concept, we assume the following parameters for the same system as in Figure 35 and 
Table. 17: 
 
Table 17   Test Data for 5-bus Test System 
 Reactance x (p.u.) Capacity (MW) 
Line 1-3 0.4 200 
Line 1-4 0.4 200 
Line 2-3 0.4 400 
Line 2-4 1.0 400 
Line 3-4-1 0.4 50 
Line 3-4-2 0.3 200 
Line 3-5 0.8 400 
Line 4-5 0.4 400 
0< PG1<1000 MW, C1 = 20 P1$/hour,0< PG2<1000 MW,C2 = 15 P2$/hour 
L3 =275MW L4 =325MW L5 =100MW 
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Figure 35   One-line diagram for a 5-bus test system 
 
The economic alarm processor module then sends signal changes including the 
LMPs, congestions, shadow prices etc. to the system operator and market participants, 
which allows them to utilize information on a variety of levels: 
 To access the short term transmission needs in the system 
 To allow for operators to re-dispatch generators based on scheduled 
transactions and real time market needs 
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 To assist in making transmission operating decisions optimal for economic 
efficiency as well as for system reliability. 
 To allow market participants to identify trends in LMP, line loading and 
demand levels in order to find/make transactions in the near future in 
anticipation of these trends. 
The IEAP could be implemented in the control center by ISO directly or by a 
third party, who would receive system sate and market data from the ISO. Those data 
may also be available for sale through private companies such as GenScape [111]. 
However, it is still a question to what extent system’s data should be open to the public. 
The system state data would be valuable to market participants, but the distribution of 
this data may raises cyber security issues [34].  
The IEAP would give the operator an alarm that  the line 3-5 is faulted, and the 
operator has to run the optimal power flow again without the faulted line. The traditional 
way to run optimal power flow will take all the currently-feasible transmission lines into 
consideration. . However, it is interested to note that reference [49] raised an idea of 
“Optimal Transmission Switching”. Assumed that taking a "healthy" transmission line 
out of service will not result in degrading current system reliability, the potential 
economic savings can be achieved. In the case study presented next, we will also verify 
this idea by taking the redundant element out to optimize the whole system benefit. 
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6.4 Case Study  
6.4.1 Background 
On September 5th 2007, a tornado in the area resulted in the tripping of two 345 
kV lines and two generators connected to the same substation. Case data taken from the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) database of the EMS monitoring 
the area are used. The first data scan was captured at approximately 07:49 AM, before 
the event occurred, and the second was captured at approximately 07:54 AM, just after 
the event occurred. 
There were 2125 alarm messages that appeared within only 45 minutes, some a 
screen shot illustrated in Figure 36. Obviously processing such large number of alarms is 
beyond the capacity of any operator to handle. Thus, operators may not be able to 
respond to the unfolding events in time, and even worse, the interpretation by the 
operators may  either be wrong or in conclusive. ERCOT operators also indicated in 
interviews that the list containing large number of alarms provides little help for them. 
They normally just make phone calls to look up for the faulted section, which may take 
15-20 minutes and even longer. 
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Figure 36   Alarm message in control center 
 
The protection system configuration for this case is shown in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37   Protection system configuration diagram 
 
The system consists of 9 sections, including 3 buses, 2 generators and4 
transmission lines. 
 
6.4.2 Simulation Results 
Case 1: 
This case assumes the circuit breaker is tripped by the associated relays, thus 
allowing the relay status to be obtained to validate the fault. The operation of circuit 
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breakers CB4210, CB4220, CB4160, and CB4920 are detected, see in Figure 38. 
 
Diagnosis result: Line BBSES_60A is faulted, and its truth value is 0.8550.  
 
Figure 38   FRPN model analysis procedure for Line BBSES_60A 
 
When the signal designating that BBSES_60A (which is line 3-5) is out of 
operation is sent to the economic alarm processor module, the current situation is 
quickly analyzed, and a summary report is shown in Table 18. 
In this example, the loss of line 3-5 causes the line 3-4-1 to exceed its thermal 
capacity. To relieve it from violating the limit, the module gives two suggested actions. 
The first one is to adjust the generation which results in an increase in the total 
generation cost. The second option is to take the line 3-4-1 out assuming no other 
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reliability or security standards are violated, and the system total generation cost will 
remain the same. 
 
Table 18   Economic Alarm Processor Summary Report for Fault BBSES_60A 
Before the fault:   
Fault detected? No  
Any thermal violations? No  
Generation 1 300 MW  
Generation 2 400 MW  
Total Generation Cost 12000 $/hour  
After the fault: (if no action is taken)
Fault detected? Line 3-5 is out  
Any thermal violations? Line 3-4-1 exceeds the limit by 2MW 
Generation 1 300 MW  
Generation 2 400 MW  
Total Generation Cost 12000 $/hour  
Suggested Actions:   
Option 1 Increase PG1 and decrease PG2 
Fault detected? Line 3-5 is out  
Any thermal violations? No 
Generation 1 330 MW  
Generation 2 370 MW  
Total Generation Cost 12150 $/hour  
Changes in Total Generation Cost Increased by 150$/hour  
Option 2 Taking Line 3-4-1 out. 
Fault detected? Line 3-5 is out  
Any thermal violations? No 
Generation 1 300 MW  
Generation 2 400 MW  
Total Generation Cost 12000 $/hour  
Changes in Total Generation Cost No  
 
 Case 2: 
This case assumes that no protective relay signals are available. Unit 1 tripped, 
and operation of circuit breakers CB4210, CB4220, CB4160, CB4170, CB4920 are 
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detected, see in Figure 39. 
Diagnosis result: Unit 1 is faulted, and its truth value is 0.8550.  
 
Figure 39   FRPN model analysis procedure for Unit 1 
 
When the signal designating that Unit 1 is lost is sent to the economic alarm 
processor module, the IEAP will analyze the system state and market data and give a 
summary report shown in Table 19. 
When PG1 is lost, the system is unbalanced and on the edge of collapse. The 
system operator has to find a solution to restore the system immediately. The easiest and 
most intuitive way would be increase PG2 by 300 MW. However, two lines would 
exceed the thermal limits even though the total generation cost decreased. Thus, the 
operator has to find alternative generation from reserve services or real-time market, 
which will certainly have a great impact on the market participants' bidding strategies. 
The last solution would be to cut the load in node 3, 4 or 5, but the system operator has 
to compensate the customers a lot. 
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Table 19   Economic Alarm Processor Summary Report for Fault Unit 1 
Before the fault:   
Fault detected? No  
Any thermal violations? No  
Generation 1 300 MW  
Generation 2 400 MW  
Total Generation Cost 12000 $/hour  
After the fault: (if no action is taken)
Fault detected? Unit 1 is out  
Any thermal violations? System is unbalanced  
Generation 1 0 MW  
Generation 2 400 MW  
Total Generation Cost NA  
Suggested Actions:   
Option 1 Increase PG2 by 300MW 
Fault detected? Unit 1 is out  
Any thermal violations? Line 2-3 exceeds the limit by 84MW 
Line 3-4-1 exceeds the limit by 5.5MW 
Generation 1 0 MW  
Generation 2 700 MW  
Total Generation Cost 10500 $/hour  
Changes in Total Generation Cost Decreased by 1500 $/hour  
Option 2 Find alternative generations from reserve 
services or real-time market  
Option 3 Cut the load  
 
 
6.4.3 Impact on Market Participants 
Participants are very sensitive to every single event happened in the electricity 
market. The LMPs are calculated every five minutes in ERCOT’s real time market. 
Market operators from ERCOT admitted that it is possible that EMS (Energy 
Management System) fails to deliver the latest fault event and topology change 
information to MMS (Market Management System).  Price errors caused from those 
inaccurate system inputs could be tremendous. And the impacts will arise in varies 
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aspects.  
The first impact will be on the “traditional” MPs, such as generation entities and 
load entities. Take case 1 as an example, since there is congestion after the fault 
happens. Failure to aware the topology change will result in a LMP differences, which 
lead to huge economic profits/losses, as shown in Table 20? 
 
 Table 20   Impacts of Unaware System Topology Changes 
 Real price when retrieve 
the IEAP report on time  
Fail to retrieve the latest 
fault event information 
Differences 
LMP 3 8 $/MWh 15 $/MWh 7 $/MWh 
LMP 4 28 $/MWh 15 $/MWh 13 $/MWh 
LMP 5 28 $/MWh 15 $/MWh 13 $/MWh 
Gen 1 Output = 330 MW 
Revenue = 6600 $/hr 
Output = 300 MW 
Revenue = 6000 $/hr 
Revenue loses 600 $/hr 
Gen 2 Output = 370 MW 
Revenue = 5550 $/hr 
Output = 400 MW 
Revenue = 6000 $/hr 
Revenue gains 450 $/hr 
Load 1 Pays 2200 $/hr Pays 4125 $/hr Cost goes up 1925 $/hr 
Load 2 Pays 10500 $/hr Pays 5625 $/hr Cost goes down 4875 $/hr 
Load 3 Pays 2800 $/hr Pays 1500 $/hr Cost goes down 1300 $/hr 
 
From the tables above, Generation 1 will lose 600 $/hr, and customers in Load 1 
have to suffer a cost increase. On the other hand, Generation 2 and customers in Load 2 
 106 
  
and 3 will enjoy an unexpected profit due to the unawareness of the system topology 
changes.  
The second impact is related to the Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR), which 
will involve many big hedge fund and investment bank participants.  
CRR is a purely financial instrument and does not represent a right to receive, or 
obligation to deliver physical energy. ERCOT allocates a portion of the available CRRs 
to Non Opt In Entities (NOIEs) as a pre-assigned CRR (PCRR) and auctions the 
remaining capacity monthly and annually. Most CRRs are tradable in the CRR auction, 
in the day- s betweahead market, or bilaterally. A typical type of CRRs would be Point-
to-Point (PTP) CRR which ien a designated point of injection (source) and point of 
withdrawal (sink). PTP CRRs might be purchased in the form of PTP option or PTP 
obligation. The charge and payment are based on the difference in LMPs between source 
and sink, i.e. the holder of an M megawatt CRR from a to b at time t receives: 
CRR revenue =  M * [LMP(a) – LMP(b)] 
Back to case 1, for instance, if a MP holds 100MW PTP obligation from node 4 
to node 3 at the time when fault happens, he would have gained (28-13)*100 = 1500 $/hr 
profit. However, due to the lack of the timely system information, he receives nothing 
and loses the obligation payment.  
In real market world, the numbers are in millions. Market operators claims that 
they may correct the price errors after they found the false input data. However, it will 
take a tedious process and may raise a lot of other problems related to the contracts and 
protocols. 
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6.5 Summary 
In this Section, it is discussed that one or more faults occurring in the system 
could trigger numerous alarms, and those alarms will put the system/market operation 
into alert state. Those alarms will be only sent to the system operator to verify the fault 
and take appropriate actions to restore the system. The processed information could be 
distributed to all the market participants for their future strategies in the market.  
From the simulation test, we may draw the conclusion that our proposed 
Intelligent Economic Alarm Processor model works properly for the practical cases, and 
have the following characteristics compared with those traditional solutions: 
 Take electrical grid alarms and power market schedules and trends, such as 
LMPs and prices, as our inputs 
 Have the system operational alarms, fault severity indications and solutions, as 
well as the impact on the electricity market as our outputs 
 Benefit for both system and market operators, and all other market participants. 
 Greatly reduce the processing time while increase the accuracy. 
 Avoid price errors that will result in unexpected costs and unearned profits. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Summary of Achievements 
The fast development of power system brings more complexities in the system 
operation and electricity market as there is larger amount of data and more price signals. 
It also has placed great emphasis on the availability of the grid information, the analysis 
of this information, and the subsequent decision-making to optimize system operation in 
a competitive environment. This creates an urgent need for better ways of correlating the 
market activity with the physical grid operating states in real time and sharing such 
information among market participants. Choices of command and control actions may 
result in different financial consequences for market participants and severely impact 
their profits. Because of this, new solutions have to be implemented toward integrating 
grid control and market operations taking into account both good engineering practices 
and appropriate economic incentives. 
The main achievements and contributions of this research are summarized as 
follows: 
 Fault section estimation 
The Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets technique has combined strength of uncertainty 
processing, rule-based reasoning, symbolic representation, and parallel 
computing. It makes fault section estimation more accurate, fast and adaptive to 
system changes. Especially, the reasoning process can be visualized in a form of 
graphical representation of Petri-nets. The rule base and parameters are saved in 
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matrix forms and the whole reasoning process is implemented by matrix 
operations. This will significantly facilitates the procedure of rule base building 
and maintenance. 
 The integration of IED data with SCADA data 
IED Data are able to reflect the state of power system with a high resolution and 
wide-area perspective, and hence are more reliable than SCADA data. The 
proposed approach to combine IED data and SCADA data will further enhance 
the accuracy of fault section estimation. 
 Reliability and life cycle assessment of protection devices 
This dissertation proposes a new approach to assess the circuit breaker’s life cycle 
or deterioration stages using its control circuit data. In this approach, the 
“classical” healthy, minor and major deterioration stages have been 
mathematically defined by setting up the limits of various performance indices.  
The model can be automatically updated as the new real-time condition-based 
data become available to assess the CB’s operation performance using probability 
distributions. The methodology may also be used to quantify the effect of 
maintenance making use of the defined performance indices, which further helps 
in developing system-wide risk-based decision approaches for maintenance 
optimization. 
 Impact of physical grid operating states on real-time market activity  
The proposed Intelligent Economic Alarm Processor (IEAP) model takes the best 
aspects of the use of existing artificial intelligent techniques to interpret alarms 
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and extends it for electricity market use. Such approach is able to generate the 
fault alarm analysis and economic summary report automatically and immediately 
after the fault occurs with an explanation of the cause-effect relationship 
associated with the fault and recommendations to optimize the grid’s total benefits. 
The predicated limitations of available transmission capacity (ATC) that is 
problematic can be identified when caused by a fault and power transfer needs as 
a consequence of such events can be anticipated. 
 
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
The following aspects need to be considered in future work: 
 Improvement in the fault section estimation module 
The weight factors need to be assigned through collaboration of the experienced 
operators and maintenance staff, who are especially familiar with the importance 
and expected reliability of each component in the power system of interest. 
Sensitivity analysis could be performed to better understand the importance of 
each component in the FRPN model 
 Cost-benefit analysis of the maintenance for the protection devices 
One notable advantage of the proposed failure probability index is that it gives 
insight into which component of the breaker is causing the problem instead of just 
reporting the failure rate (number of failures per year). Knowing the CB’s exact 
troubled area and its deterioration stage is very important to making appropriate 
maintenance strategies since difference maintenance policies’ may have different 
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cost that varies a lot. A cost–benefit analysis with this proposed methodology will 
be the research focus in the future. 
 Extensive use of Intelligent Economic Alarm Processor 
The IEAP model takes the best aspects of the use of existing artificial intelligent 
techniques to interpret alarms and extends it for electricity market use. Other 
market indices such as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) may be added in the 
summary report for the benefit of the whole system and market participants. 
 Cyber security issue 
Making the system data available to MPs may raise potential of cyber security 
breach issues and hence adequate data protection needs to be implemented. An 
option for the ISO to provide system state data to a third party who would then 
perform alarm analysis and make the information available to all MPs should be 
explored. While the system operation data may not be available to all the MPs due 
to cyber security reasons, a quick and accurate analysis IEAP report will benefit 
both system and market operators, and all other market participants, to avoid 
unnecessary price errors that will cause big profits/losses. 
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